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1. INTRODUCTION 
On the I s ' of June 2006 a Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) be-
tween the European Community (EC) and Morocco was signed in Brussels 1. 
The agreement had been originally initialled on 28 July 2005 by the Euro-
pean Commission and the Kingdom of Morocco and represented the result of 
a long period of difficult negotiations which had followed the termination of 
the previous bilateral fisheries agreement between the EC and Morocco in 
1999 2. 
The agreement will last for a period of four years and it allows access 
for Community vessels to Morocco's Atlantic fisheries. It provides for the 
* The author gratefully acknowledges the European Community support under the 
Marie-Curie Intra-European Fellowship programme. The author is also grateful for the help-
ful comments received by Andre Nollkaemper and Attila Tanzi on previous drafts of the arti-
cle. Usual disclaimers apply. 
1 . Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Communit ies and the King-
dom of Morocco (FPA), in Council Regulation (EC) No 7 6 4 / 2 0 0 6 of 2 2 May 2 0 0 6 , in Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 1 4 1 ( 2 0 0 6 ) , p. 1. 
2 . See Agreement on Cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Com-
munity and the Kingdom of Morocco. Protocol setting out fishing opportunities and the finan-
cial compensation and financial contributions, 1 9 December 1 9 9 5 , in Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 3 0 6 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , p . 7 . This agreement lacked a renewal clause. 
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granting of 119 fishing licenses for Community vessels (mostly Spanish ves-
sels, but also including vessels from a variety of other EC countries, such as 
Portugal, France, Italy) and a maximum of 60000 tonnes of pelagic fish 
shared according to an allocation key between Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, Ireland, Spain, France and Portugal 3. 
In exchange, the Protocol included in the agreement provides for a financial 
contribution paid by the Community over the four years set at EUR 144.4 
millions plus the fees to be paid by shipowners -around EUR 13.6 millions- 4 . 
What appears to be a rather uncontroversial and standard technical 
agreement -which is very similar in all its major aspects to the many bilater-
al agreements entered into by the EC with non-Member States in the exercise 
of its competence in the field of fisheries- has sparked at Community level 
strong criticism, especially by MEPs and the civil society, because of the al-
leged extension of the geographical scope of the FPA to the waters off the 
coast of Western Sahara. If the agreement is implemented in the same way as 
previous agreements were implemented, it will allow EC vessels to fish in 
Western Sahara's territorial waters and EEZ thanks to licences granted by the 
Moroccan authorities 5. A recurrent claim has been that the agreement and 
such practice are contrary to international law as they fail to respect the right 
of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. As a result of these ob-
jections, two legal opinions have been produced by the Legal Service of the 
3. Council Regulation No. 764, supra n. l , A r t . 2 . 
4. FPA, supra n. 1, Protocol, Art. 2. 
5. While sovereignty over territorial waters accrues automatically as a result of the sepa-
rate status of Western Sahara, the interesting question should be raised whether we can justi-
fiably refer to an EEZ with regard to a NSGT, where self-determination has not been exer-
cised yet. In this respect, one can refer to the claim made by the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic and POLISARIO as legitimate representatives of the people of Western Sahara, 
which may be considered at least sufficient to extend the legal regime over the exploitation of 
natural resources in NSGTs to Western Sahara 's EEZ: "The Saharawi Arab Democratic Re-
public (SADR) has an obvious and inherent right to develop and conserve the resources of the 
sea off its coast. That area of the Atlantic Ocean which is to be preserved free of fishing and 
oil development by other States is clear: it is the area of the sea extending from north to south 
along the SADR coast - f rom our land frontier with Morocco to the frontier with Mauritania, 
all seaward to a distance of 200 nautical miles from this coast- . Case after case in internation-
al law, together with the practice of coastal States throughout the world and the provisions of 
the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention make clear this right to an offshore area. 
The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is committed to peaceful and shared uses of the seas 
- a n d to asserting a sovereign jurisdiction over those resources which are found within what 
would be our 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone - " . Statement by HE Emhamed 
Khadad, 17 May 2005 , Oil and Gas Licence Offering Meeting, London, available at 
http://www.sadroilandgas.com/pdfs/StatementHEEmhamedKhadad-17May2005.pdf. 
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Parliament and the Legal Service of the Council, respectively, on the compat-
ibility of the agreement with international law, some amendments have been 
proposed by the Parliament (and still a large group of MEPs have refused to 
approve the agreement) and one Member State, Sweden, has eventually de-
cided to cast a negative vote in the Council 6. However, at the end, the agree-
ment has been approved by the Council without any major amendment, 
which means that it does not exclude Western Sahara from its geographical 
scope of application nor that it strengthens the monitoring mechanisms as re-
quested by the Parliament. 
The present contribution aims at providing an exhaustive legal analysis 
of the issues involved in an assessment of the compatibility of the FPA with 
international law, with special consideration for the distinct status of Western 
Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT) and the principle of sov-
ereignty over natural resources of the people of Western Sahara. The article 
starts off setting out the historical and legal background of the question of 
Western Sahara. It then focuses on the analysis of the FPA and the practice re-
lated to previous fisheries agreement entered into by Morocco and EC. In the 
third section it concentrates on the question of validity of the FPA, with spe-
cial reference to the competence of Morocco to enter into an international 
agreement conferring rights and obligations with respect to Western Sahara 
and to the applicability of the grounds of invalidity related to the infringe-
ment of jus cogens rules. In the fourth section it focuses on the compatibility 
of the FPA with international law, especially focusing on the obligations of 
Morocco and the EC towards Western Sahara: special regard is given to the 
question of sovereignty over natural resources in Western Sahara and to the 
legal opinions rendered in 2002 by the UN Legal Office and in 2006 by the 
EU Council's and Parliament's Legal Services. Moreover, the question of the 
application of the law of belligerent occupation to Western Sahara is ad-
dressed, with a view to identifying the rights and obligations imposed upon 
Morocco by such application, with special regard to the use of natural re-
sources found on the territory of Western Sahara. Finally, the article con-
cludes by reflecting on the possibilities of challenging the FPA before the In-
6. See Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of the Parliament, Doc. SJ-0085/06, 20 Feb-
ruary 2006, available at http://www.fishelsewhere.org/legal.htm; Legal Opinion of the Legal 
Service of the Council, Doc. 6664/06,22 February 2006 (only available paras. 1-5); European 
Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion 
of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom 
of Morocco, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0201, 16 May 2006; Council of the European Union, Press 
Release, 2730th Meeting, 22 May 2006, p . 18. 
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ternational Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or a 
domestic court and on the broader implications of its signature for the pres-
ent diplomatic stalemate in the solution of the Western Sahara dispute. 
The main thesis presented is that the agreement is not per se contrary to 
international law as its text does not include Western Sahara; however, if its 
interpretation and practice should evolve to include Western Sahara in its ge-
ographical scope of application, as it occurred with previous EC-Morocco 
fisheries agreements, it may be considered invalid with regard to Western Sa-
hara due to a manifest lack of legal competence of Morocco related to the 
Territory and contrary to international law, insofar as it does not keep into due 
account the will of the people of Western Sahara. As a result, the agreement 
may be considered non-opposable with regard to the Western Sahara and may 
give rise in the future to a right to compensation against the European Com-
munity for the use of natural resources by the people of Western Sahara and 
a possible future State of Western Sahara. As things stand today, the chances 
that such right may be enforced are very slim. 
2. A SHORT REHEARSAL OF THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION 
We shall recall briefly the fundamental historical and legal issues in-
volved in the Western Sahara question 7. Western Sahara, a very large, mostly 
deserted, territory stretching for over 1000 km. along the north-western At-
lantic coast of Africa and sparsely populated by nomadic tribes united by a 
common cultural and linguistic heritage, was colonised by Spain in 1884 8. 
After obtaining membership of the United Nations, Spain soon began consid-
ering Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and was in turn 
7. For a general study on Western Sahara from the point of view of international law see 
SOROETA LICERAS, J.: El Conflicto del Sahara Occidental, reflejo de las contradiciones y 
carencias del Derecho Internacional, 2001 , Bilbao. Other general works dealing with the his-
tory and politics of the Western Sahara question are e.g. JENSEN, E.: Western Sahara: Anato-
my of a Stalemate, 2004, Boulder; SHELLEY, T.: Endgame in the Western Sahara: what Future 
for Africa's last Colony, 2004, London. 
8. According to the latest estimates (June 2006) there are about 273000 people living in 
Western Sahara, the large majority being people settled by Morocco in the last decades (CIA, 
The World Factbook, at http://www.cia.gOv/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wi.html#Intro). Ap-
proximately 165000 Saharawi refugees live in the camps in the Algerian province of Tindouf 
at the border with Western Sahara (source Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tin-
douf_Province). 
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qualified by the General Assembly (GA) as "administering Power" 9. The GA 
also demanded Spain to undertake immediate steps to guarantee the exercise 
of self-determination by the people of the Spanish Sahara 1 0. 
While most of the international community was united in asking an un-
conditional support for speeding-up the process of self-determination in the 
Territory in the face of Spain's reluctance to relinquish its grip on the region, 
two neighbouring States began putting forward their claims. Morocco and 
Mauritania, despite initially not recognising each other's claim and despite 
re-affirming their commitment to self-determination, considered the Spanish 
Sahara to come "naturally" under their sovereignty because of the cultural 
ties and historical ties with the region, which had been broken by the expan-
sionist policy of European colonial powers and especially Spain 1 1 . By 1974, 
in the wake of Franco's illness, Spain was bowing to international pressure 
and eventually had to commit itself to the organisation a referendum on self-
determination; on the other hand, Morocco and Mauritania were becoming 
more vocal about their sovereign rights over the territory. 
That resulted the following year in Morocco and Mauritania leading the 
way to a request by the GA to the International Court of Justice for an advi-
sory opinion on the status of Western Sahara, with an aim at receiving at least 
an implicit legal endorsement for their claim. GA Resolution 3292 drafted the 
question in the following narrow terms, i.e. whether Western Sahara was ter-
ra nullius at the time of the Spanish colonisation and, if the answer was in the 
negative, what were the legal ties between the Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity 1 2. The reply of the Court did not howev-
er meet Morocco's and Mauritania's expectations. The Court avoided follow-
ing a narrow approach dictated by the type of question and confirmed the ap-
plicability of the right of self-determination to the people of Western Sahara, 
regardless of the legal situation at the time of colonisation 1 3. Furthermore, af-
ter having answered negatively to the first question, it concluded by 14 votes 
to 2 that there was little evidence indicating effective and exclusive authority 
exercised by Morocco over the territory in the period preceding the Spanish 
settlement, thus Morocco could not rely on any legal tie of territorial sover-
9 . G A R e s . 2 0 7 2 (XX), 1 7 December 1 9 6 5 . 
1 0 . G A R e s . 2 2 2 9 (XXI) , 2 0 December 1 9 6 6 , 2 3 5 4 (XXII) 1 9 December 1 9 6 7 , 2 4 2 8 
(XXIII) 2 7 December 1 9 6 8 , 2 5 9 1 (XXIV) 1 6 December 1 9 6 9 , 2 7 1 1 (XXV) 1 4 December 
1 9 7 0 , 2 9 8 3 (XXVII) 1 4 December 1 9 7 2 , 3 1 6 2 (XXVIII) 1 4 December 1 9 7 3 . 
1 1 . See FRANCK, T.: "The Stealing of the Sahara", 7 0 AJIL ( 1 9 9 6 ) , p . 7 0 2 . 
1 2 . G A R e s . 3 2 9 2 (XXIX), 1 3 December 1 9 7 4 . 
1 3 . Westen Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports ( 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 1 2 , at 3 4 - 3 7 . 
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eignty over the territory 1 4; the same conclusion, by 15 to 1 and on the same 
legal grounds, was reached with respect to Mauritania 1 5. 
The response by Morocco to the publication of the advisory opinion was 
baffling, as it read in the opinion an endorsement to its claim 1 6 . Moreover, 
within weeks, Morocco first announced and then put into practice a "Green 
march", that is a massive, peaceful march of 350,000 Moroccan civilians into 
Western Sahara in order "to gain recognition of [its] right to national unity 
and territorial integrity" 1 7. In the face of Security Council's division on the is-
sue and of Spain's reluctance to forcefully protect the territory, the Green 
march was the first act of occupation by Morocco of Western Sahara 1 8. 
The second act that gave some form of legitimation to the carving out of 
Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania was a Tripartite Agree-
ment entered into by Spain with the two African States ten days after the 
Green March and six days after Franco's death 1 9 . The agreement consisted of 
a declaration and some secret annexes. In the declaration Spain confirmed its 
resolve to terminate as soon as possible the administration of Western Sahara 
and to that end it instituted a temporary administration together with Moroc-
co and Mauritania and in consultation with the Djemaa (the advisory body set 
up by Spain and made of representatives of the Saharawi people friendly to 
the colonial power) to which all its powers and responsibilities as Adminis-
tering Power would be transferred 2 0. Through the secret annexes, Spain 
would gain participation at a 35% rate in the phosphate industry, it would 
maintain access to the fisheries of Western Sahara and it would obtain a re-
nunciation by Morocco of all this latter's claims over Ceuta and Melilla until 
the question of Gibraltar would be settled (sic). In exchange, the agreement 
14. Ibid., p . 48 and pp . 56-57. 
15. Ibid.,p.68. 
16. "...the opinion of the Court can only mean one thing: the so-called Western Sahara 
was part of Moroccan territory over which the sovereignty was exercised by the Kings of Mo-
rocco and that the population of this territory considered themselves and were considered to 
be Moroccans.. . To-day Moroccan demands have been recognised by the legal advisory organ 
of the United Nations". Press release of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Na-
tions on 16 October 1975, quoted in UN Doc. S/PV.1849, at 11, cit. in Franck, supra n. 11, p . 711 . 
17. lbid.,p.lV2. 
18. The response of the Security Council was "toothless" according to Franck (Franck, 
supra n. 11,714) . It must however be mentioned that the Council, while not acting under Ch. 
VII , "deplored" the March and called upon Morocco to withdraw from the Territory. See SC 
Res. 380 (1975), 6 November 1975. 
19. Declaration of principles between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania on the Western 
Sahara, Madrid, 14 November 1975, UNTS Vol. 988,1-14450. 
20. Ibid., An. 2. 
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allegedly provided for the ultimate division of the Territory between the two 
African States, with Morocco retaining two-third and Mauritania gaining 
control over the southern part. The response given by the General Assembly to 
the agreement was contradictory: on the one hand, the Assembly re-affirmed 
the inalienable right of self-determination of the people of Western and the 
responsibilities of Spain with regard to the organisation of a referendum 2 1; on 
the other, the Assembly took note of the Tripartite Agreement and called on 
the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to establish contacts with 
the interim administration in order to assist it in holding a free consultation 
with the Saharan population 2 2. 
The entry of Moroccan and Mauritanian forces in Western Sahara was 
met by heavy resistance from the national liberation movement, POLISARIO, 
which received military equipment from Algeria, the Soviet Union and North 
Korea. What ensued was a high intensity guerrilla warfare, in which despite 
initial territorial gains by POLISARIO, Morocco and Mauritania gained control 
of all major towns and most of the coast and the majority of the Saharawi 
population found shelter in refugee camps established in the Algerian desert. 
Notwithstanding the final withdrawal of Spain and the declaration of inde-
pendence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by POLISARIO 
in February 1976, Morocco and Mauritania formalised the annexation of 
Western Sahara in April 1976, when the two countries signed an agreement 
of boundary delimitation in which Western Sahara was carved out in accor-
dance with the ratio 2/3 for Morocco and 1/3 for Mauritania 2 3. 
Due to the heavy military losses caused by POLISARIO'S guerrilla warfare 
and the realisation of the limited natural resources available in the south of 
Western Sahara, Mauritania decided in 1979 to drop its legal claim to part of 
the Territory, to recognise the SADR as the legitimate authority in Western 
Sahara and to withdraw from Western Sahara 2 4. The military success was for 
2 1 . G A R e s . 3458(A) (XXX), 10 December 1975. 
22. G A R e s . 3458(B) (XXX), 10 December 1975. 
2 3 . See Convention concerning the State frontier line established between the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco, Rabat, 14 April 1976, in UNTS Vol. 
1035,1-15406. The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic de facto exercises authority over the 
Tindouf refugee camps and control the eastern part (largely unpopulated) of Western Sahara. 
It has its governmental seat in the refugee camps in Tindouf and is a member of the Organi-
zation of African Union. At the time of writing, it is recognised by 47 States (not including 
Western States), 35 other States, many of which in the last few years, having withdrawn or 
"frozen" their recognition pending the final solution of the dispute. 
24. A/34/427-S/13503, Annex I and II , Official Record of the Security Council , Thirty-
Fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979. 
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POLISARIO short-lived as Moroccan forces soon moved to occupy the south-
ern part of the Territory vacated by Mauritania, despite the repeated protests 
of the international community 2 5. The diplomatic deadlock and the hostilities 
between POLISARIO and the Moroccan forces continued in the following 
years: Morocco responded to the increasing military losses by elevating a 
sand wall of over three metres cutting diagonally for over 2000 km. the terri-
tory of Western Sahara and by positioning an estimated three millions land-
mines on the their side of the wall. 
Also in the face of a military situation increasingly stabilised by the 
completion of the berm, a step forward was made in 1988 with the signature 
by Morocco and POLISARIO of a Settlement Plan promoted by the UN and the 
Organization of African Union for the organisation of a referendum and the 
exercise of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as identified 
by the 1974 Spanish census 2 6 . The plan was endorsed by the Security Coun-
cil in 1990 and led to the conclusion of a cease-fire between Morocco and 
POLISARIO in 1991. The 1990s saw the unfolding of a new phase in the West-
ern Sahara conflict, in which all efforts were devoted to the implementation 
of the Settlement Plan, including the appointment of a Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Western Sahara and the deployment of a small UN 
peace-keeping mission (MINURSO). The main stumbling block revealed to 
be the identification of those entitled to vote with the attempt of Morocco to 
include the many settlers who had been moved from Morocco in the success-
ful attempt to change the demography of the Territory and with the problems 
related to the thousands of Saharawi refugees living in other countries 2 7. An-
other problem identified by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, 
James Baker, was the lack of enforcement mechanisms, should the referen-
dum have resulted in a result in favour of independence 2 8 . In sum, while the 
cease-fire continued to hold, the political process did not make any major 
progress as the parties failed to reach an agreement on the technical details of 
the referendum. 
The latest phase of the Western Sahara crisis has been characterised by 
the elaboration by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of two peace 
plans, one in 2001 and one in 2003. The 2001 Draft Framework Agreement 
25. See G A R e s . 34 /37 ,21 November 1979; G A R e s . 35/19,11 November 1980. 
26. The plan was approved by the Security Council in 1990. See SC Res. 658 (1990) and 
SC Res. 690 (1991). 
27. MILANO; Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effective-
ness, Legality and Legitimacy, Leiden, 2006, pp. 168-169. 
28. SG Report of 13 February 2000, S/2000/131. 
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provided for a transitional period of five years in which a Western Sahara Ex-
ecutive Authority would be created, while leaving Morocco exclusive com-
petence for foreign affairs, national security and external defence; in the ref-
erendum all residents in Western Sahara for the preceding year would be 
entitled to vote 2 9 . The plan proved unacceptable for POLISARIO and Algeria, as 
it would have represented a radical departure from the Settlement Plan and 
given full weight to the policy of settlements pursued by Morocco for over 20 
years. 
The second and latest plan, the Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of 
the People of Western Sahara has been proposed in 2003, and it has gone 
some way in meeting POLISARIO's demands 3 0 . It still provides for a transition-
al period in which a Western Sahara Executive Authority would be formed 
and it still leaves some vital areas in the hands of Morocco, but it makes the 
residence requirement for voting in the referendum stricter (voters must be 
residents in the Territory continuously since 30 December 1999). After some 
initial hesitance, POLISARIO has lent its support to the plan; but, this time, Mo-
rocco has made known that while conceiving fully fledged autonomy for the 
region, it remains opposed to any solution of statehood and independence 3 1. 
In conclusion, after 16 years of bloody conflict and decades of diplomat-
ic efforts to realise the right of self-determination for the people of Western 
Sahara, there is little indication that any final solution may soon be reached. 
After so many years of struggle and deprivation, the POLISARIO and the Sa-
harawi are showing resilience to any solution short of independence; Moroc-
co, on the other hand, pays little costs in maintaining the status quo (the sub-
ject of the present analysis is evidence of that) and shows no willingness to 
reach a solution in the short term. More worryingly for the final solution of 
the dispute, there is little evidence that the international community is willing 
to step up its pressure on Morocco to make sure it eventually co-operates in 
the organisation and holding of the referendum on self-determination. 
3. THE 2006 FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
Fishing in the waters off the Atlantic coast of Morocco and Western Sa-
hara has been a time-honoured practice for Spanish fishermen, especially for 
29. S/2001/613,Annex 1. 
30. S /2003/565,Annex2. 
3 1 . SG Report of 13 October 2005, S/2005/648. 
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small-scale fishers from Andalusia and the Canary Islands. Larger-scale fish-
ing from other Spanish regions, especially Galicia, began in the 1960s, when 
the Spanish fishing industry started developing 3 2. Spain, when entering into 
the 1975 Tripartite Agreement on Western Sahara, sought and obtained a com-
mitment by Morocco to the effect that access for Spanish vessels to the fish-
rich waters of Western Sahara would not be impaired, despite the declaration 
by Morocco two years earlier of a 70 mile-wide exclusive fishing zone 3 3 . 
The first fisheries treaty signed by Morocco and Spain in 1977 provided 
for the creation of joint ventures between Spanish and Moroccan fishermen, 
but it never entered into force due to the lack of ratification by the Moroccan 
parliament. Spanish vessels continued fishing in those years despite all the 
uncertainties surrounding the legal regime of the waters off the coast of West-
ern Sahara and the continuous tensions with Moroccan patrols. Moreover, a 
number of incidents occurred in which Spanish vessels were attacked by 
POLISARIO boats and Spanish fishermen hijacked by POLISARIO. The first fish-
eries agreement between Morocco and Spain to enter into force was signed in 
1983 3 4 . The agreement distinguished in terms of fishing rights two areas, that 
north of Cape Noun and the Mediterranean and that south of Cape Noun. 
This latter corresponds to the waters off the coast of Western Sahara. Accord-
ing to the then Secretary of State of Spain, the differentiation was intention-
ally made in order to distinguish Morocco's waters and the fisheries of West-
ern Sahara and the conclusion of the agreement should not have been 
interpreted as a recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the territory 3 5. 
Again, in the following years, POLISARIO made clear its claim to the natural 
resources in the waters of Western Sahara: a number of grave incidents oc-
curred in which POLISARIO gunned down Spanish fishing vessels and took 
hostage numerous crew members, as a result of which the offices of POLIS-
ARIO in Madrid were shut down 3 6 . 
In 1986, with its entry into the'EC, Spain had to relinquish to the Com-
munity its competence to enter into fisheries agreements, which is why from 
32. BARREIRA, A., FABRA, A., MARTINEZ, A., TUDELA, S.: Local Communities and Fish-
ing Disputes in Sanaran and Moroccan Waters: Opportunities for New Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms, The Earth Council, San José, April 1998, p . 5. 
33 . Soroeta Liceras, supra n. 7, p . 227. See Dahir, No . 1.73.211 establishing the Limits 
of the Territorial Waters and the Exclusive Fishing Zone of Morocco, 2 March 1973, available at 
http://www.un .Org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFnLES/MAR_1973_Act.p 
df, as supplemented by Dahir concerning Act No. 1.73.255 of 23 Novembre 1975. 
34. Ibid.,V. 229. 
35. Ibid., p . 230. 
36. /&</., p . 231 . 
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then onwards we find a series of fisheries agreements concluded between 
Morocco and the EC. On the other hand, the Spanish interest remained 
prominent. The EC, in the exercise of its exclusive competence in the field of 
fisheries, entered into bilateral agreements with Morocco in 1988 with the 
conclusion of the 1988-1992 fisheries agreement, in 1992 with the conclu-
sion of the 1992-1995 agreement and in 1995 with the conclusion of the 
1995-1999 agreement 3 7 . After 1999 it became impossible to reach an agree-
ment on renewal and official fisheries relations were broken off until 2005: 
as a result of that especially the affected Spanish fleet (244 vessels employ-
ing almost 4000 crew members) had to undergo a restructuring plan 3 8 . 
The main difference between the 2006 FPA and the previous fisheries 
agreement is that the former is much less ambitious both in terms of financial 
contributions offered by the EC and in terms of number of licenses and diver-
sity of pelagic species included. This is the result of the increasing reluctance 
of Morocco since the 1990s to grant access to foreign vessels to the fishing 
zones under its jurisdiction, both due to the depletion of certain species such 
as the cephalopods (octopus and squid) and due to the efforts of Morocco to 
develop its own industrial fishing fleet and to boost its own exports of fish. 
As of today, Morocco has become the top fish exporter in Africa 3 9. On the 
other hand, while the Spanish fleet remains the main beneficiary of the agree-
ment, access to industrial pelagic fishing is granted to vessels from a consid-
erably higher number of EC member States, including new Members. Except 
for that, the 2006 FPA re-introduces most of the features characterising the 
previous EC-Morocco agreement. 
The FPA (incorporated into the Community legal order through a Coun-
cil regulation) is made of the agreement proper, plus a Protocol and an Annex 
thereto in which are laid down the technical and financial terms regulating 
fishing by EC vessels in Moroccan waters 4 0 . Like most of the bilateral fish-
37. 1988 Agreement on relations in the sea fisheries sector between the European Com-
munity and the Kingdom of Morocco, OJ L181 (23/06/1988); 1992 Agreement on relations in 
the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, OJ 
L407 (31/12/1996); 1995 Agreement in the sea fisheries sector between the European Com-
munity and the Kingdom of Morocco, OJ L30 (31/01/1997). 
38 . Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, 
Fisheries Committee, Rapporteur Daniel Várela Suanzes-Carpegna, A6-0163/2006, Explana-
tory Statement, p . 11. 
39. See BARREIRA et al., pp. 11-12; American Chamber of Commerce in Morocco, Trade 
and Investment, Guide 2004, at http://www.moroccousafta.com/amchamguide.htm, p . 65. 
40. FPA, supra n. 1. 
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eries agreements concluded between the EC and third countries, the main 
feature of the agreement is that it provides for a net financial contribution of 
€144.4 million to be paid by the EC over the five years of the duration of the 
agreement 4 1 . Within this amount, € 13.5 million per year shall be put "to-
wards defining and implementing a sectoral fisheries policy in Morocco 
with a view to introducing responsible fishing in its waters" 4 2 . As already 
mentioned, the EC receives 119 fishing licenses for Community vessels 
(mostly Spanish vessels, but also including vessels from few other EC coun-
tries, such as Portugal, France, Italy) and a maximum of 60000 tonnes of 
pelagic species for industrial fishing shared according to an allocation key 
between Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, 
Ireland, Spain, France and Portugal 4 3 . Unlike for previous agreements, ac-
cess for EC vessels to some of the most economically valuable species such 
as cephalopods (octopus and squid) and crustaceans (prawns, langoustines 
and lobsters) is denied. The same applies for fishing in Morocco's Mediter-
ranean waters. Moreover, while vessels landing part of their catch are granted 
a reduction on their fee, landings are compulsory for certain species as set 
out in Appendix 2 4 4 . 
The other important feature for the purpose of this article (for the rea-
sons explained in a following section) is the procedure through which the li-
censes are issued, which is also analogous to that used under previous agree-
ments. The applications for licenses are submitted by relevant Community 
authorities on behalf of the shipowners to Morocco's Fisheries Department, 
with all details concerning the category of fishing, the zone, the tonnage 
used, the number of vessels; individual applications are also possible in ac-
cordance with Art. 1(5) and (6) of the Annex 4 5 . Morocco's Fisheries Depart-
ment shall issue fishing licenses to the Delegation of the EC Commission in 
Morocco for all vessels 4 6. 
But certainly the most vital issue in terms of the agreement's implica-
tions for the Western Sahara question is its geographical scope. The contro-
versial question is whether the geographical scope includes the waters of 
Western Sahara as well. In Art. 2(a) the FPA defines the Moroccan fishing 
zone as "the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the King-
4 1 . Ibid,, Protocol, Art . 2(1) 
42. Ibid., Protocol, Art. 6(1) 
4 3 . Ibid., Council Regulation, Art: 2. 
44. Aid . , Appendix 2. 
45 . Ibid.,Annex,Art. 1 
46. Ibid., Annex, Art. 2. 
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dom of Morocco" 4 7 . The formula is the same used in previous EC-Morocco 
agreements. While the term "sovereignty" is certainly indicative of the terri-
torial waters of Morocco, the term "jurisdiction" is more neutral and it may 
indicate the whole of the areas in which an EEZ is enforced by Morocco, in-
cluding the waters off the coast of Western Sahara 4 8. No indication can be de-
rived from other parts of the agreement, especially Appendix 4, which breaks 
down Morocco's fishing zones according to the type of fishing: the southern-
most zone is south of 29°00', a geographical point north of the Morocco-
Western Sahara international border. It is also noteworthy that the Commis-
sion has carefully avoided any answer to that question, leaving the "burden" 
of deciding on Morocco 4 9 . In conclusion, it is impossible to disagree with the 
European Parliament Legal Service's opinion that the agreement, as it stands, 
neither includes nor excludes the waters of Western Sahara 5 0. 
One should then wait and see whether the practice of Morocco and the 
EC with regard to the FPA will lead to an inclusion in the agreement of the 
waters of Western Sahara. This is especially important with regard to the in-
terpretation of Art. 2(a). Art. 31(3)(b) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties between States and International Organizations or be-
tween International Organizations, equally to Art. 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vien-
na Convention on the Law of the Treaties, provides that in establishing the in-
tention of the parties "there shall be taken into account... any subsequent 
practice in the interpretation of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation" 5 1. Despite not having entered into 
force yet and despite not having been the ratified by Morocco and the EC, the 
1986 Vienna Convention is widely considered expression of customary inter-
national law in most of its substantive parts, including that on interpretation 
of treaties. Should the practice related to the agreement lead the EC to request 
47. Ibid..An. 2(a). 
48. Act No. l-81of 18 December 1980, Promulgated by Dahir No. 1-81-179 of 8 April 1981, 
establishing a 200-mile-nautical Exclusive Economic Zone off the Moroccan coast, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISL^ 
49 . Answer of Commissioner Joe Borg, European Parliament, Debate of 15 May 2006, 
available at http://www.europarl .europa.eu/omk/sipade3?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+ 
20060515+ITEM-018+DOC+XML+V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S&L=EN; Answer of Com-
missioner Joe Borg, European Parliament, 22 June 2006, E-1745/06, available at 
http:/ /www.europarl .europa.eu/omk/sipade3?L=EN&OBJID=123215&LEVEL=3&SAME_ 
LEVEL=l&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y. 
50. Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament, 20 February 2006, 
SJ-0085/06, available at http://www.fishelsewhere.org/legal.htm (last visited 7 May 2006) 
5 1 . 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Or-
ganizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, 25 ILM (1986), p . 543 . 
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and Morocco to grant licenses concerning the waters of Western Sahara, the 
word "jurisdiction" in Art. 2(a) should be interpreted as including those wa-
ters. 
In all likelihood, the practice related to the agreement will include the 
waters off the coast of Western Sahara especially with regard to industrial 
fishing. Reportedly, this was the case with the previous agreements between 
the EC and Morocco especially because of the specific interests of the Span-
ish fleet in the region to fish the valuable species excluded from the current 
agreement 5 2. Unfortunately, the details of the implementation of the previous 
fisheries agreements have never been published by the Commission and we 
were unable to track down any public documentation proving the granting of 
these licenses for Western Sahara. But at least one element in the 1992-1995 
Agreement did indeed indicate the inclusion of Western Sahara in the geo-
graphical scope of the agreement, i.e. the inclusion of the port of Dakhla, sit-
uated on the coast of Western Sahara, in Annex I, paragraph H(2) concerning 
"Technical inspection" 5 3. 
The Commission has been very reticent in providing data on the imple-
mentation of previous agreements even to MEPs and an amendment ap-
proved by the Parliament requiring the Commission to draw up an annual re-
port on the implementation of the agreement was not taken up by the 
Council 5 4. Another indicator is that Morocco is also investing considerably in 
the renovation and expansion of the ports of El-Aaiun and Dakhla, based in 
Western Sahara, which according to 2006 statistics were already first and 
fourth respectively in terms of landings of fish nation-wide 5 5 . In any case, 
while past practice as well as predictions of future practice are not legally rel-
52. See for istance the Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council , 22 February 
2006, para. 4. 
5 3 . See European Parliament, Report of the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Rural Development on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion 
of the Agreement on relations in the sea fisheries sector between the European Economic 
Community and the Kingdom of Morocco and laying down provisions for its application, 4 
December 1992, A3-0394/92. 
54. See Report Várela, supra n. 38 , Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution, 
Amendments 5 and 7. See also the answer of Commiss ion Joe Borg, European Parl iament, 
17 July 2006 , E-1744/06, stating with regard to the 1995-1999 agreement that "[n]o data 
exists that would make it possible to identify the precise location of the fishing effort under 
this Agreement" (available at h t tp : / /www.europar l .europa.eu/omk/s ipade3?L=EN&OB-
J ID=124834&LEVEL=3&SAME_LEVEL=l&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y) . 
55 . Office National des Peches du Maroc, Peche Cótiére et Artisanale au Maroc, Rapport 
Statistique Année 2006, at http://www.onp.co.ma/images/Pdf/direct/Rapport%20Statis-
tique_Mars%202006+++++.pdf. 
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evant for the interpretation of the present agreement, the practice of the Com-
mission is indicative of the Community attitude towards the question which 
has been to go on with fishing business keeping the lowest profile possible in 
order to avoid the diplomatic dimension of the Western Sahara question. 
However, the diplomatic dimension of the agreement has not escaped 
the attention of many MEPs and of some member States. The Development 
Committee of the European Parliament sought in January 2006 legal advice 
from the Legal Service of the Parliament on the compatibility of the agree-
ment with international law 5 6 . The Legal Service responded that the agree-
ment does neither include nor exclude the waters of Western Sahara, that it 
would be up to Morocco to comply with its international obligations vis-a-vis 
the people of Western Sahara and that the Community could eventually enter 
into consultations with a view to suspending the agreement, should the im-
plementation by Morocco disregard the interests of the people of Western Sa-
hara 5 7 . Despite the green light given by the legal opinion, a large minority 
formed in the Parliament requesting the explicit exclusion of Western Sahara 
from the agreement 5 8. A request put forward by some Member States and the 
Commission to approve the agreement through the emergency procedure 
(hence avoiding Parliament's scrutiny) was rejected by the Parliament 5 9. 
Eventually, despite the opposition of 167 and the abstention of 79 MEPs, the 
Parliament decided to follow the advice of the Legal Service and adopt the 
resolution drafted by the Fisheries Committee, which requested only some 
amendments strengthening the monitoring mechanisms 6 0. 
The agreement was also controversial within the Council. Almost simul-
taneously with the request by the for a legal opinion by the Parliament's De-
velopment Committee, the Working Party on External Fisheries Policy, after 
pressure from Nordic countries, asked the Council Legal Service for a writ-
ten opinion on the compatibility of the FPA with international law. The opin-
56. Request for an opinion of the Legal Service, Committee on Development, European 
Parliament, 25 January 2006. 
57 . Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of European Parliament, supra n. 50, para. 45 . 
58 . This large minority included most members of the European Greens, of the European 
United Left, of the Liberal Democrats , some independents and a part of the MEPs from the 
Socialist Party (mostly from Nordic countries, Britain and the Netherlands). 
59. See FISHELSEWHERE: "European Parliament delays attempts to force through 'illegal' 
Agreement; Rift between Member States intensifies", 4 April 2006, at http://www.fishelse-
where.org/documents/EP%20delays%20Commission.doc 
60. See Minutes of Proceedings, Results of Roll-Call Votes, Annex, 16 May 2006, at 




ion has not been made public, but first-hand information indicates that the re-
sponse of the Legal Service reached the same conclusions reached by the Par-
liament's Legal Service. Despite the reassurances from the Council's Legal 
Service, Sweden eventually decided to cast its negative vote and issue a sep-
arate statement, Finland abstained and together with the Netherlands issued 
also a separate statement, Ireland supported the agreement but issued a sepa-
rate statement 6 1. Eventually, the agreement was approved in the form pro-
6 1 . Despite indications in the Council that it would abstain, Sweden eventually voted 
against the agreement as a result of a decision made by the Swedish parliament. This is the 
text of the Swedish declaration: "Sweden has decided to vote against the Council Regulation 
on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community 
and Morocco as it does not take into full consideration that Western Sahara is not a part of the 
territory of Morocco under international law and a process is underway to find a just , lasting 
and mutually accepted political solution to the conflict, which will allow for the self-determi-
nation of the people of Western Sahara, as envisaged by the UN Security Council; all con-
cerned are not ensured to benefit from the Implementation of this agreement in accordance 
with the will of the people of Western Sahara, as provided by international law. Sweden con-
siders that the Joint Committee shall make use of all available instruments to ensure that the 
implementation of this Fisheries Partnership Agreement will be in conformity with the rules 
and principles of international law (emphasis added)". The joint statement by the Netherlands 
and Finland is the following: "With regard to the Council Regulation on the conclusion of the 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Mo-
rocco, the Netherlands and Finland wish to: Recall that the EU fully supports the efforts of the 
UN, and in particular of the Personal Envoy of its SG, Mr Peter van Walsum, to mediate be-
tween the various parties with an interest in Western Sahara towards a just , lasting and mutu-
ally accepted political solution of the conflict which will allow for the self-determination of 
the people of Western Sahara as envisaged by the UN Security Council [ ] Underline that the 
conclusion of a FPA may not be construed to be diminishing support for this process, and does 
in no way prejudge the outcome of this process with regard to the status of Western Sahara. 
In particular, the FPA may not be considered as acceptance of territorial claims not supported 
by international law. Consider that future dialogue within the FPA's Joint Committee will be 
of special importance and that the Joint Committee shall endeavour to make use of all avail-
able instruments to ensure that the implementation of this FPA will be in conformity with the 
rules and principles of international law, including the principle of 'permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources ' , and thus that activities under the agreement in the territory of West-
ern Sahara will be conducted for the benefit of the original population, on their behalf or in 
consultation with their representatives". Finally, the statement of Ireland should be fully quot-
ed: "Ireland supports the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Eu-
ropean Community and the Kingdom of Morocco on the basis that it does not prejudice the 
longstanding position of the EU on the status of the Western Sahara. The EU continues to sup-
port the efforts of the UN Secretary General to encourage a negotiated solution which will al-
low the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination. Ireland empha-
sises the importance of the future dialogue within the EU-Morocco Joint Committee foreseen 
under this agreement. It is essential that the Joint Committee make use of all instruments un-
der the Agreement to ensure that the Agreement is implemented to the benefit of all the peo-
ple concerned and in accordance with the principles of international law". 
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posed by the Commission and all amendments requested by the Parliament 
were dropped by the Council, most likely with a view to avoiding any further 
negotiation on the implementation and monitoring mechanisms with Morocco. 
The FPA has been officially signed by a delegation of the Council and 
Morocco on the 30 t h of May in an official ceremony in Brussels, with the nec-
essary ratification soon expected by the Moroccan Parliament in Rabat. 
4. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE FPA WITH REGARD TO WESTERN 
SAHARA 
The analysis here must follow the hypothesis (with all likelihood re-
alised) that the practice related to the agreement will cover the waters of 
Western Sahara. It goes without saying that should the agreement end up not 
including Western Sahara, no problem concerning the validity and/or legality 
of the agreement would arise. 
We shall start by considering the question of validity of the agreement, 
i.e. its "ability" to create legal rights and obligations with regard to Western 
Sahara. While it is obviously the case that Western Sahara is beyond the geo-
graphical scope of EU and EC legal competence, we must first analyse the 
position of Morocco with regard to Western Sahara and whether it is indeed 
in the position to create international legal rights and obligations with regard 
to the Territory. The answer must be answered in the negative as Morocco 
does not have sovereignty over the Territory, it is not an administering Pow-
er, nor is its presence justified by other legal means, such as a consent ex-
pressed by the Saharawi people, by the former administering power Spain or 
a Ch. VII mandate by the Security Council. 
The most authoritative statement on the lack of sovereignty by Morocco 
over Western Sahara can be found in the 1975 ICJ advisory opinion. As seen 
above, the core of the Court's opinion was that the people of Western Sahara 
enjoy the right to self-determination and that despite the historical and cultur-
al ties between Morocco and Western Sahara the former does not enjoy sov-
ereign rights over the Territory 6 2. As a consequence of the lack of exercise of 
their right of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara -who may 
have ultimately opted for the incorporation or association with Morocco-
nothing has changed in this respect in over thirty years. The universal lack of 
62. Western Sahara, see supra section 2. 
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recognition of the Moroccan annexation by the international community and 
the continuing practice of the UN General Assembly to enlist Western Sahara 
among the NSGTs are further evidence of the unchanged status of Western 
Sahara and the lack of sovereignty by Morocco 6 3 . In conclusion, sovereignty 
cannot be the legal justification for Morocco to confer international legal 
rights and obligations with regard to Western Sahara. 
May we consider Morocco an administering Power having competence 
to enter into international agreements with regard to the administered terri-
tory? Again, the answer must be in the negative. As argued elsewhere and 
explained above, Spain remained de facto and de jure the administering 
Power for Western Sahara until 1976, but it never transferred its status to 
Morocco or other States 6 4 . The 1975 Madrid Tripartite Agreement, whose 
validity has been rightly doubted because of the incompatibility of one of 
the secret annexes with the right to self-determination of the people of West-
ern Sahara 6 5 , created a joint temporary administration between Morocco, 
Mauritania and Spain with a view to Spain "terminating the responsibilities 
and powers [...] over that Territory as administering Power" 6 6 . Even conced-
ing ex hypothesis that Spain had the power to transfer its Charter's obliga-
tions to a third party without the General Assembly's consent - a controver-
sial assertion in itself- 6 7, the wording of the agreement shows that Spain did 
not intend to transfer the competence of administering Power to Morocco 
and Mauritania, but only to create a joint temporary administration for the 
transitional period leading to Spain's withdrawal. In fact, if one wished to 
look for the real "intention" of Spain concerning the final status of Western 
Sahara at that point in time, the point of reference should be the secret annex 
in which Spain committed itself to a transfer of sovereignty to Morocco and 
Mauritania. The annex remained secret because politically unfit to stand 
scrutiny from the international community and blatantly contrary to the right 
of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara from a legal point of 
view. 
6 3 . E.g. see 2005 Report of the Special Commit tee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, General Assembly, Official Records, 60th Session, Supplement no. 23 , A/60/23. 
64. Ruiz MIGUEL, C : " IS the EU-Morocco fishing agreement an attempt by Spain to le-
galise Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara?", Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos, Analy-
sis n. 97, at http://www.gees.org/english/pdf/2232/. 
65 . See Soroeta Liceras, supra n. 7, pp. 158ff. 
66. Tripartite Agreement, supra n. 19, paras. 1-2. 
67. For a negative answer to this question see Soroeta Liceras, supra n. 7 , pp. 151ff. 
430 
THE NEW FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN. 
It must be also underlined that the United Nations, both through the 
General Assembly and the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives 
for Western Sahara never recognised the status of Morocco as administering 
Power; in fact, in 1979 and 1980 Morocco was twice characterised by the 
General Assembly as "occupying power" 6 8 . Nor has such status been official-
ly recognised by Spain since 1975 or any other country. As of today, Spain is 
still reported as the de jure administering Power 6 9 . Some recent statements of 
the Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos indicate a change in 
attitude on the part of the new Spanish government, towards recognising a 
new role for Morocco as administering Power: at this stage it is premature to 
conclude that this represents an historical turn in the Spanish position on 
Western Sahara or whether it was only dictated by contingent calculations re-
lated to the conclusion of the FPA 7 0 . For the sake of completeness, one has to 
observe the use of the expression of "puissance administrante" (administer-
ing power) in the French version of a 2001 reports by the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral on Western Sahara: but as rightly observed elsewhere, the English ver-
sion adopts consistently the expression "administrative Power", avoiding the 
use of the General Assembly's denomination "administering Power", more-
over the Security Council has simply "considered" the two reports, without 
welcoming or endorsing them 7 1 . 
Australia's successfull defence in the East Timor case concedes to the 
argument that a State occupying a NSGT without a proper legal basis lacks 
legal capacity to create international legal rights and obligations concerning 
that territory. While Portugal made a differentiation between the validity of 
the East Timor Gap Treaty and its legality (only this latter being the subject 
of its application to the Court), Australia denied the significance of that dif-
ferentiation to the dispute claiming that the issue at hand could be only one of 
68 . See G A R e s . 34/37, 21 November 1979; G A R e s . 35/19 of 11 December 1980, 11 
December 1980. 
69 . See Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 
73(e) of the Charter of the United Nations (A/60/69), 8 June 2005. 
70. Ruiz MIGUEL (supra n. 64, pp . 1-2) refers to four occasions - i n the period between 
June and August 2005 leading to the conclusion of the F P A - in which Spain's Foreign Minis-
ter stated that the Madrid Agreement gave Morocco the quality of administering Power with 
regard to Western Sahara. Again, one must observe that art. 73 of the UN Charter provides for 
a number of legal obligations of "good governance" incumbent upon administering Powers 
with regard to NSGTs, including the submission of periodical reports to the Secretary-Gener-
al on the progress towards self-government of the territory in question. Morocco has not act-
ed or even only claimed to act in compliance with these obligations. 
7 1 . S/2001/613,cit . in ibid.,pp. 6-7. 
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validity: either Indonesia did have legal capacity to enter into treaties con-
cerning East Timor, hence the treaty was valid, or Indonesia's presence was 
unlawful rendering treaties concerning East Timor invalid 7 2 . Thus the pre-
condition for adjudicating any legal dispute concerning the East Timor Gap 
Treaty was the exercise of jurisdiction over the actions and acts of Indonesia, 
an exercise that was prevented by the lack of consent given by Indonesia. The 
Court was ready to follow Australia's argument. According to the Court: 
"...the very subject-matter of the Court's decision would necessarily be a deter-
mination whether, having regard to the circumstances in which Indonesia en-
tered and remained in East Timor, it could or could not have acquired the pow-
er to enter into treaties on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its 
continental shelf. The Court could not make such a determination in the absence 
of the consent of Indonesia." (emphasis added)73 
But even in the unlikely scenario where the international community 
started considering Morocco the new administering Power for Western Sa-
hara, there is little support in law for the assertion that at this stage of the dis-
pute it could enter into treaties creating rights and obligations with regard to 
the natural resources of the Territory. This point was illustrated by the Arbi-
tral Tribunal in the case Affaire de la Delimitation de la Frontiére maritime 
entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Senegal1*. Guinea-Bissau contested the validity 
of an agreement concluded in 1960 by France and Portugal, the former colo-
nial powers, concerning the delimitation of the maritime zones between 
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal on the basis that the principle of self-determina-
tion of peoples would entail as a corollary the restriction on the colonial power 
to enter into treaties concerning the territory once a process of national liber-
ation has been started 7 5. While the Tribunal accepted Guinea-Bissau's gener-
al proposition (also conceded by Senegal), it rejected Guinea-Bissau's argu-
ment on the basis that the process of national liberation in Guinea-Bissau had 
not acquired an international relevance (portee internationale) at the time of 
the conclusion of the exchange of letters between France and Portugal, so to 
restrict the competence of the colonial power to enter into international 
72. East Timor Case (Portugal/Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90, Counter-memorial of 
Australia, Part II, Chap. 1, pp. 88ff. 
7 3 . Ibid., Judgment of 30 June 1995, p . 102. 
74. Affaire de la Delimitation de la Frontiére maritime entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sene-
gal (Guinea Bissau/Senegal), Decision of 31 July 1989, RIAA (Vol. XX) , p . 119. 
75. Ibid.,p. 135. 
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agreements concerning the fundamental rights of the people 7 6 . According to 
the Tribunal, national liberation movements acquire international relevance 
"á partir du moment oü elles constituent dans la vie institutionnelle de l'Etat 
territorial un événement anormale qui la force á prendre des mesures excep-
tionelles, c'est-a-dire lorsque, pour dominer ou essayer de dominer les événe-
ments, il se voit amené á recourir á des moyens qui ne sont pas ceux qu'on 
emploie d'ordinaire pour fair face á des troubles occasionnels" and it is only 
from that moment onwards that the adminstering Power loses its competence 
to conclude treaties concerning the essential rights of the people 7 7 . Measuring 
the situation of Western Sahara, there is little doubt that the national libera-
tion struggle conducted by POLISARIO for over 30 years acquired from the 
very beginning an international relevance, and that the POLISARIO has contin-
ued to represent internationally the Saharawi people until today. One must 
conclude that even conceding Morocco's status as administering Power, its 
competence to enter into international agreements concerning Western Sa-
hara's natural resources is legally curtailed by the clear willingness of the 
people of Western Sahara to pursue their route to self-determination. Hence, 
the FPA may be found invalid to the extent that it intends to create interna-
tional rights concerning the use of fisheries in Western Sahara's waters. 
By contrast, it is impossible to identify in the agreement a conflict with 
any jus cogens norm as a further ground of invalidity and distinct ground of 
illegality 7 8. In the same arbitration just mentioned, the panel made also clear 
that the rule preventing colonial powers to enter into treaties concerning NS-
GTs after the rising of a national liberation movement could not be consid-
ered a jus cogens rule deriving from the principle of self-determination, thus 
no question of treaty invalidity could arise as a result of the breach of a jus 
cogens norm 7 9 . Equally, no claim of invalidity may be justified on the basis 
76. Ibid.,p. 138. 
77. Ibid. 
78 . Quite interestingly, the conflict of a treaty with a norm of jus cogens is at the same 
time a ground of invalidity and a ground of illegality. Art. 53 of both the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties be-
tween States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (supra 
n. 51) provides that "[A] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the inter-
national community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character". 
79. Ibid.,pp. 135-136. 
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that the FPA breaches the right of self-determination of the Saharawi people, 
as the FPA simply does not touch upon the issue and it would not touch upon 
it even if its practice was to extend to the waters of Western Sahara. Finally, 
while the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources by the 
people of NSGT is part of customary international law 8 0 and it applies to the 
situation at hand, the rules deriving from it can be hardly characterised as jus 
cogens norms. 
To sum up, there is a clear chance that the FPA may be considered in-
valid to the extent that it would cover the waters of Western Sahara. What 
would that mean in practice? Apart from the distinct but remote possibility 
that an international or domestic court found the agreement to be invalid, a 
more likely scenario would be the general non-opposibility of the FPA with 
regard to Western Sahara. In other words, the EC could not rely on the agree-
ment to demand Morocco the granting of fishing licenses for the waters of 
Western Sahara, despite the fulfilment of its obligations towards Morocco 
such as the payment of its financial contribution. On the other hand, Moroc-
co could not oppose the agreement to the EC to complain for or sanction con-
ducts of European fishermen in the waters of Western Sahara which do not 
comply with the requirements set out in the agreement. To counter that, either 
party to the agreement could potentially raise the principles of good faith and 
estoppel to contest the claim of invalidity and non-performance of the other 
party, but this claim should be substantiated by clear evidence that Western 
Sahara was included in the geographical scope of the agreement already at 
the negotiation stage or during its implementation; at any rate, the application 
of these principles in the bilateral relation between Morocco and the EC does 
not seem sufficient to discard the objective character of the invalidity pro-
duced by the lack of treaty-making competence of Morocco with regard to 
Western Sahara. A more adequate legal ground on which to counter a claim of 
invalidity would be the expression of consent by the people of Western Sa-
hara through their legitimate representatives8 1. More importantly and regardless 
of issues of succession to treaties 8 2 , the EC could not oppose the agreement 
as binding upon a new Western Sahara's administration, be it international or 
80. See the obiter dictum to that effect in Case Concerning the Armed Activities in the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo/Rwanda), Judgment of 19 Decem-
ber 2005, para. 244, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm 
8 1 . See infra section 5. 
82. For a discussion on the question of treaty succession with regards to NSGTs see 
D.M. Ong, "The Legal Status of the 1989 Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty Following 
the End of Indonesian Rule in East Timor" XXXINYIL (2000), p . 67, at p . 9 3 . 
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local, that may arise within the progress of the political process before the 
date of termination of the treaty. 
5. THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE FPA WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The other important and distinct question to address is the compatibility 
of the agreement with international law, i.e. whether the FPA and its execu-
tion may be considered in breach of any rule of international law. As already 
mentioned, the question was already debated within the European Parliament 
and within the Council and it sparked two requests for legal opinions, from 
the Parliament's Development Committee to the Legal Service of the Parlia-
ment, and from the Working Party on External Fisheries Policy of the Coun-
cil to the Legal Service of the Council 8 3 . While both opinions are for most 
part covered by confidentiality rules, the opinion of the Parliament's Legal 
Service was leaked to the public. Reportedly, the Council's Legal Service 
reached the same conclusion using similar arguments. 
The Parliament's Legal Service's opinion of 20 February 2006 starts by 
considering the political and historical background of the Western Sahara 
question. The first important admissions in the legal opinion are those indi-
cating the lack of sovereignty by Morocco over Western Sahara and the lack 
of status as administering Power for Morocco 8 4 . However, the Legal Service 
fails to draw from those findings any particular legal consequences on the 
competence of Morocco to enter into treaties with regard to Western Sahara. 
Also, and rightly so, it does not refer on this specific point to the legal opin-
ion rendered by the UN Legal Office on 12 February 2002 on the legality un-
der international law of two contracts concluded in 2001 by Morocco with 
two foreign oil companies for the exploration of oil and gas resources in the 
continental shelf of Western Sahara, as that opinion was concerned with con-
tracts between Morocco and foreign companies and did not touch upon the 
question of treaty-making power of Morocco in Western Sahara 8 5 . Nonethe-
83 . European Parliament, Committee on Development, Request for an opinion of the Le-
gal Service, 25 January 2006; Council of the European Union, Working Party on External 
Fisheries Policy, Request of 19 January 2006. 
84. Legal Service of the European Parliament, Legal Opinion, supra n. 6, para. 11. 
85 . The opinion was sought by the UN Security Council in relation to contracts conclud-
ed between the Moroccan authorities and two oil companies, Kerr Mc-Gee and Total Fina, con-
cerning the exploration and future exploitation of oil resources in the continental shelf of West-
ern Sahara. See Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/161. 
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less in his parliamentary written answer of 15 March 2006, the EU Commis-
sioner for Fisheries Mr Borg stated: 
"[R]egarding the question whether Morocco can conclude agreements con-
cerning the exploitation of natural resources of Western Sahara, the opinion of the 
UN legal adviser gives a clear answer. [...] agreements can be concluded with the 
Kingdom of Morocco concerning the natural resources of Western Sahara. This 
is so because the interpretation given by the UN legal adviser implies that Moroc-
co is a 'de facto' administrative power of the territory of Western Sahara and con-
sequently has the competence to conclude such type of agreement"86. 
In our opinion, the Commission underestimates the difference between 
Morocco's power to enter into a contract or concession (potentially wrongful, 
but still regulated by Moroccan law) and Morocco's power to enter into an in-
ternational agreement concerning Western Sahara (regulated under interna-
tional law) and eventually tends to draw unwarranted conclusions from the 
UN legal opinion. As seen above and in accordance with the findings of the 
Arbitral Tribunal in Guinea-Bissau!Sene gal, there is a clear case to be made 
that there exists a rule under international law that the jus tractatus of (even) 
an administering Power concerning the essential rights of a people, such as 
that over its natural resources, is limited once a national liberation movement 
has developed. A fortiori that limitation should apply to a "de facto authori-
ty", whose legal basis has not been recognised by any State or international 
body. The consequence of Morocco entering into the FPA with a view to reg-
ulating the access of foreign vessels to Western Sahara's fisheries is that it is 
violating the rights of the people of Western Sahara; thus, the FPA may be 
found in violation of the rule of international law identified by the Arbitral 
Tribunal in Guinea Bissau!Senegal*1. 
The Parliament's Legal Service's opinion rightly devotes full attention 
to the UN legal advice on another point of international law. The opinion 
identifies the main thread of the UN opinion in the lack of an absolute prohi-
bition on the use of natural resources in a NSGT by foreign interests and in 
the conclusion that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
86. See Written Question by Caroline Lucas (Verts/ALE) and Raul Romeva y Rueda 
(Verts/ALE) to the Commission of 15 February 2006; Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of 
the Commission, 15 March 2006, para. 2. 
87. As we have seen above (section 4) the rule identified by the Arbitral Tribunal in 
Guinea Bissau v. Senegal represents not only a ground of illegality, but also a ground of inva-
lidity. 
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sources "has to be understood in the sense that it opposes only those econom-
ic activities which are not undertaken in accordance with the interests and 
wishes of the people of the territory and deprive fheirf of their legitimate 
rights over their natural resources" 8 8 . Departing from the UN opinion, it ar-
gues that the rules of international law such as those deriving from the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty over natural resources should be respected 
also by the EC when exercising its powers in place of its Member States 8 9 . 
However, specifically relating these findings to the FPA, the Legal Ser-
vice appears to identify a number of obligations which apply only to Moroc-
co, especially the duty to conduct any exploitation of natural resources for the 
benefit of the local population. The Legal Service states that "it cannot be 
prejudged that Morocco will not comply with its obligations under interna-
tional law vis-á-vis the people of Western Sahara. It depends on how the 
agreement will be implemented. In this respect, the Agreement explicitly ac-
knowledges that the Moroccan authorities have a 'full discretion' regarding 
the use to which this financial contribution is put (Article 2(6) of the Protocol). 
It is therefore up to them to assume their responsibilities in that respect" 9 0 . 
The monitoring mechanisms created under the FPA are considered by the Le-
gal Service a possible tool in the hands of the EC to ensure that Morocco 
complies with its obligations vis-á-vis the people of Western Sahara in using 
the financial contribution paid to Morocco. Eventually, the legal opinion sug-
gests, should "the Moroccan authorities disregard manifestly their obliga-
tions under international law vis-á-vis the people of Western Sahara, the 
Community could eventually enter into bilateral consultations with a view to 
suspending the agreement (Article 15 of the Agreement and article 9 of the 
Protocol)" 9 1. 
These important findings of the Legal Service deserve some comments. 
One is that the Legal Service appears to "move the goal post", by focusing on 
Morocco's obligations towards the people of Western Sahara, rather than the 
Community obligations. While conceding the obligation to carry out eco-
nomic activities in a NSGT for the benefit of the people of that territory, the 
Legal Service appears to indicate that such obligation should apply to Moroc-
co in the case at hand. As for the monitoring mechanisms at the EC's dispos-
al, it is unclear whether the opinion suggests a due diligence obligation in-
88. UN Legal Advice, supra n. 85, para. 19 
89. Legal Service of the European Parliament, Legal Opinion, supra n. 6, para. 38. 
90. Ibid., para. 42 . 
9 1 . Ibid., para. 44 . 
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cumbent on the Community concerning the way it lends its financial support 
to fishing activities in the waters of Western Sahara or whether it only wish-
es to suggest ways in which the Community could hold Morocco's account-
able for the fulfilment of its international obligations owed to the people of 
Western Sahara. The language of the relevant passages seems to suggest the 
latter interpretation. The underlying rationale seems to be that Morocco exer-
cises jurisdiction on Western Sahara, thus it is up to the African country to 
make sure that natural resources are exploited in accordance with internation-
al law. 
But such rationale entails a very narrow reading of the rights of the peo-
ple of Western Sahara and the corresponding obligations of third parties. The 
reading of the Legal Service would be warranted if the Community had en-
tered into a development and co-operation agreement to finance the develop-
ment of fisheries in Morocco's southern provinces, possibly including West-
ern Sahara. However, one cannot fail to observe that the fishing, i.e. the 
actual catch of natural resources, is carried out by Community vessels and 
that the Community has an active role in ensuring the exercise of this eco-
nomic activity in accordance with the terms of the FPA. Indeed, as seen 
above, the Community both requests the licenses for specific areas on behalf 
of the fishermen and receives the licenses from Morocco's authorities, which 
are then handed over to the fishing vessels. In other words, because of the 
Community leading role in negotiating, concluding and implementing the 
agreement, one can easily dispense with the argument that the agreement pro-
vides only for economic activities involving Morocco and private parties, for 
whose actions the Community cannot be held responsible. In sum, when en-
tering into a fisheries partnership agreement extending to a NSGT and when 
ensuring its proper implementation, the Community is bound to respect its in-
ternational obligations owed to the people of that territory. But what is the ex-
act content of these obligations? 
In a nutshell we could condense the Community's duties with regard to 
the natural resources of Western Sahara in one legal obligation, identified by 
both the UN Legal Advisor in 2002 and the Parliament's Legal Service in 
2006, i.e. that economic activities related to the NSGT should be carried out 
in accordance with the wishes and interests of the people of the NSGT 9 2 . It is 
interesting to note that even with regard to the application of this obligation 
to Morocco, the EC Legal Services, the Parliament's Fisheries Committee, 
92. UN Legal Opinion, supra n. 85, para. 25 . 
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most States in the Council and the Commission emphasise the benefit that the 
implementation of the agreement should bring to the local people for the ob-
ligation to be fulfilled. Most actors within the Community while concerned 
with the beneficial effect of the FPA for the people of Western Sahara, that is 
the need for the FPA to respect the interests of the local people, neglected the 
need to respect the wishes of the people of Western Sahara, as if the term 
"wishes" was not part of the legal obligation. Reportedly, the reading given 
of the legal obligation was that of an "or" linking "wishes" and "interests", as 
if the two elements represented an alternative. This interpretation is clear in 
the separate statement of the Netherlands and Finland in the Council, where 
the two countries demanded that "activities under the agreement in the terri-
tory of Western Sahara will be conducted for the benefit of the original pop-
ulation, on their behalf or in consultation with their representatives" (emphasis 
added) 9 3 . This interpretation was self-serving as it afforded fully discounting 
in the assessment of legality the opposition expressed by POLISARIO to the 
FPA in a letter sent in May 2005 by its Delegate for Europe to the Commis-
sion 9 4. Only Sweden continued to maintain throughout that the two terms "in-
terests" and "wishes" should be read in conjunction, hence its final stance to 
cast a negative vote in the Council. 
The interpretation defended in the Council and leniently endorsed by the 
Legal Services finds little support in a full reading the 2002 UN legal opinion 
and indeed in the body of practice analysed in that opinion. The only state-
ment to that effect in the opinion may be found in the conclusions where the 
Legal Counsel states that 
"Sta te prac t ice , though l imi ted, is i l lustrative of an opinio jur is on the part of 
bo th adminis te r ing P o w e r s and third States: w h e r e resource exploi ta t ion activities 
are conc luded in Non-Se l f -Gove rn ing Terri tories for the benefi t of the peop le s of 
these terr i tor ies , on their behalf, or in consul ta t ion with their representa t ives , they 
are cons idered compat ib le wi th the Char te r obl igat ions of the adminis te r ing P o w -
er, and in conformi ty wi th the Gene ra l A s s e m b l y reso lu t ions and the pr inc ip le of 
' pe rmanen t sovereignty over natural r e sources ' enshr ined t he r e in" 9 5 . 
The State practice referred to by the Legal Counsel in an earlier section of 
the advice refer to an instance of State practice by Spain and two instances of 
93 . Separate Statement of the Finland and the Netherlands, supra n. 6 1 . 
94. Letter of the POLISARIO Representative to the EU Commissioner Mr Borg, Brussels, 
18 May 2005. 
95 . UN Legal Opinion, supra n. 85, para. 24. 
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State practice by UN transitional administrations: according to the Counsel, 
"cases of resources exploitation in Non-Self-Governing Territories have, for ob-
vious reasons, been few and far apart" 9 6. The instance related to the Spanish 
economic interests in the phosphate industry in Western Sahara shows Spain's 
commitment at that time to use the revenues derived from mining for the devel-
opment of the territory and the benefit of the population. The case related to ura-
nium exploitation in Namibia shows an instance where the UN Council for 
Namibia considered any form of foreign exploitation of natural resources in 
Namibia illegal, but that, according to the Counsel, was due to the resolutions 
and sanctions adopted by the Security Council during the crisis. Finally, the 
Counsel analyses the practice of UNTAET with regard to the continuation of the 
East Timor Gap Treaty and the conclusion of the draft 2002 Timor Sea Arrange-
ment: in both occasions UNTAET consulted fully with with representatives of 
the East Timorese people, who had an active role in the negotiation process 9 7. 
According to the UN Counsel, this State practice is matched by a num-
ber of General Assembly resolutions that show a development in the doctrine 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources: from a stricter interpreta-
tion emphasising the inalienable rights of the people under colonial domina-
tion to their natural resources, the General Assembly directs itself to a new 
interpretation that differentiates between economic activities which are detri-
mental to the people and economic activities which are beneficial to them 9 8 . 
The annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Economic and other activ-
ities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Ter-
ritories" has since 1995 reiterated "the value of foreign economic investment 
undertaken in collaboration with the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries and in accordance with their wishes in order to make a valid contribution 
to the socio-economic development of the Territories" (emphasis added) 9 9 . 
96. /Wd.,para. 18. 
97. Ibid., paras. 18-20. 
98 . Ibid., paras. 9-14. 
99 . See GA Res. 50/33 of 6 December 1995, reiterated annually, latest resolution G A 
Res. 60/111 of 8 December 2005. These resolutions have been approved by a very large ma-
jority of States, with the odd abstention or negative vote cast by Western States and Israel. The 
EP Legal Service seems to cast doubts over the legal significance of these resolutions. At 
para. 39 of its opinion it states that "these resolutions, even if they may have an important po-
litical significance, cannot be considered, as such, as a source of international law, because 
they are not legally binding". While the observation of the Legal Service is strictly speaking 
correct, one should not underestimate the value of legal principles consistently reiterated by 
the GA on a regular basis with a very large majority. Together with the 2002 UN Legal Opin-
ion -wh ich is also as such "not legally legally b ind ing" - they shed light on a State practice 
which is scarce and far from consistent. 
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Taking into account all these factors, the UN Legal Counsel rightly 
comes to the final conclusion that "if further exploration and exploitation ac-
tivities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people 
of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the international law princi-
ples applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territo-
r ies" 1 0 0 . The same principle is re-affirmed in the Legal Service's opinion 
more than once, save for then failing to draw some consequences and conclu-
sions with regard to the conclusion of the FPA and the lack of regard for the 
view expressed by the POLISARIO front, as legitimate representative of the Sa-
harawi people, by both Morocco and the Commission. 
In sum, while there are some ambiguities in both legal opinions that may 
have warranted the interpretation given by most actors at Community level, 
we believe that the most tenable interpretation of the position of internation-
al law with regard to the exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara 
is that it should be conducted for the interests of the people of the territory 
and giving due regard to their wishes. Should the Community and Morocco 
interprets the agreement to extend to the waters of Western Sahara and should 
they continue to disregard the views of POLISARIO and the SADR with regard 
to the FPA 1 0 1 , they would violate the international legal obligations owed by 
both subjects to the people of Western Sahara. Such obligation to respect the 
views expressed by the legitimate representatives of the people of Western 
Sahara is all-the-more important given the fact that any financial contribution 
granted by the EC to Morocco under the FPA for the development of the fish-
eries sector with all likelihood will mostly benefit the population imported 
from Morocco (making a majority of the population of the main port towns 
on the coast of Western Sahara), rather than the Saharawi people (mostly liv-
ing in refugee camps in Algeria) 1 0 2 . 
100. UN Legal Opinion, supra n. 85, para. 25 . 
101. It is hardly disputable that POLISARIO as a national liberation movement and the 
SADR as a political and territorial organisation which has proclaimed independence and sov-
ereignty over Western Sahara are both legitimate representatives of the people of Western Sa-
hara. Such role has been recognised by the UN in all its diplomatic efforts to solve the dispute. 
It must be also reiterated that the SADR has been recognised by many countries and it is a 
member of the African Union. 
102. That the benefit envisaged for the "local population" relates to the coastal popula-
tion only is conceded by the Commission in its answer of 8 August 2006 (parliamentary ques-
tion E-3357/06): "With regard to the industrial pelagic fishery, the Agreement foresees the 
compulsory landing of 2 5 % of catches. The main aim of this provision is to contribute to a 
better supply of pelagic fish to the local processing industry which has been suffering in re-
cent years from short and irregular supplies,of raw material. Additional economic incentives 
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In conclusion, there are two distinct legal grounds on which the FPA and 
its extension to Western Sahara may be found in violation of international 
law: its non-compliance with the restriction on jus tractatus vested on admin-
istering Powers and a fortiori on a de facto authority in a NSGT; and the vio-
lation of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as ap-
plied to NSGTs. 
6. THE EC AND THE OBLIGATION OF NON-RECOGNITION 
APPLIED TO WESTERN SAHARA 
Another aspect that deserves a close inspection is that concerning a pos-
sible duty of non-recognition by the Community and the consequent breach 
of that duty by entering into an international agreement with Morocco ex-
tending to Western Sahara. This aspect presents in substance two distinct le-
gal questions, firstly whether an international organisation, such as the EC, 
should be held bound by an obligation of non-recognition under general in-
ternational law, and secondly whether such obligation applies to the case at 
hand. 
As for the first question, an answer may be found in the proposition that 
international organisations are bound to respect the obligation of non-recog-
nition of situations resulting from a serious violation of peremptory norms 
under general international law to the same extent that States are bound in ac-
cordance with Artt. 40 and 41 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State responsibili-
ty 1 0 3 . It is yet to be seen whether and how the ILC will deal with the matter in 
its current project on the international responsibility of international organi-
s e foreseen to encourage vessels fishing for pelagic species to land an even larger percentage 
of their catches (in addition to the compulsory 25%) in the local ports. Furthermore, in the 
context of the compulsory landings of 2 5 % , the Agreement stipulates the use of local port 
services and infrastructures. This will stimulate the activities of ports and the supply industry 
and lead to additional earnings, thereby contributing to the development of such ports. Final-
ly, the development of coastal areas should benefit under the agreement from the following fi-
nancial measures: An amount of at least € 4 . 7 5 million per year for the modernisation and up-
grading of the coastal fleet; A clause foreseeing that a part of the financial contribution should 
be used for the restructuring of small-scale fishing, training and support of professional or-
ganisations". Available at ht tp:/ /www.europarl .europa.eu/omk/sipade3?L=EN&OB-
JID= 126024&LEVEL=3&SAME_LEVEL= 1 &NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y. 
103. See ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Arts. 40 and 4 1 , in Crawford (ed.), The In-
ternational Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Com-
mentaries (2002). 
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sations; but there is little to suggest that international organisations, often at 
the forefront in sanctioning situations deriving from grave violations of inter-
national law, should not be bound by the same legal obligations States are 
bound by under general international law. With specific regard to the EC, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), while reluctant to assert powers of judicial 
review of Community acts against rules of general international law, has held 
in a number of judgements, the most important being Poulsen and Racke, that 
the Community is bound to respect customary international law and that cus-
tomary international law may represent a limitation in the exercise of powers 
by its organs 1 0 4 . 
Moreover, it is arguable that Member States of the EC have not freed 
themselves of their obligation not to recognise situations deriving from seri-
ous breaches of peremptory norms, when acting within international organi-
sations. The question of the subsidiary responsibility of Member States for 
the actions of international organisations of which they are members is a very 
controversial legal question which is currently being dealt by the ILC, under 
the leadership of Professor Giorgio Gaja 1 0 5 . In general and in accordance with 
the provision already proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report, 
we may assert that Member States should not be held responsible for the acts 
of the EC when the organisation acts within its area of exclusive compe-
tence 1 0 6 . However, one should make the useful distinction between the sub-
sidiary responsibility of the States for the action of the organisation -for 
which the Member States can bear responsibility only under the specific ex-
ceptions identified by the Special Rapporteur- and the separate responsibili-
ty for breach of obligations incumbent upon them also when acting within in-
ter-governmental bodies. In this latter perspective, the action of Member 
States must not be assessed on the basis of the institutional outcome (i.e. the 
approval and signature by the Council and the FPA as such), but in terms of 
their individual conduct at the time of voting. Thus, no violation can be en-
visaged with regard to Sweden, since they expressed their opposition to the 
FPA; the same applies to Finland, which has abstained in the vote and does 
104. See WOUTERS, E., "Giving Effect to Customary International Law Through Euro-
pean Community Law", Institute for International Law, University of Leuven, Working Paper 
no. 25 , June 2002, pp. 7-11. 
105. See especially Second report on responsibility of international organizations, by Mr 
Giorgio Gaja, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541. 
106. See draft Art. 29 of the ILC project on responsibility of international organizations 
and commentary by Special Rapporteur, Mr Giorgio Gaja, in the second addendum to his 
Fourth Report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add.2). 
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not accrue any fishing right under the terms of agreement. As for the other 
States, the Netherlands could hardly oppose with success its disclaimer that 
"the FPA may not be considered as acceptance of territorial claims not sup-
ported by international law", since it voted in favour of the agreement and its 
fishing fleet benefits from i t 1 0 7 . Regardless of the non-recognition of Moroc-
co's territorial claim, the entering into an agreement extending to the waters 
of Western Sahara remains an act of implied recognition of Morocco's au-
thority over the NSGT. Generally, all States voting in favour and accruing 
fishing rights could plausibly argue that they had voted for the FPA in the 
good faith expectation that it would not extend to Western Sahara; however, 
this latter defence should be also rejected due to the clear unwillingness on 
the part of any of the relevant EC institutions to exclude Western Sahara from 
the geographical scope of the FPA, hence the awareness on the part of all 
Member States in the Council that the FPA may end up including Western Sa-
hara, as it was the case with previous EC-Morocco agreements. 
The second fundamental question relates to the applicability of the duty 
of non-recognition to Morocco's de facto administration of Western Sahara. 
The ILC commentary to Articles 40 and 41 on the law of state responsibility 
states that this obligation "applies to 'situations'...such as, for example, at-
tempted acquisition of sovereignty over territory through the denial of the 
right of self-determination of peoples. It not only refers to the formal recog-
nition of these situations, but also prohibits acts which would imply such 
recognition" 1 0 8 . In the Namibia advisory opinion the Court pointed out that 
third States are not allowed to enter into treaty relations in all cases in which 
the wrongdoing State purports to act on behalf of or concerning the occupied 
or annexed territory 1 0 9. These descriptions fit the situation of Western Sahara 
and the extension of the FPA by the EC to Western Sahara. While the lack of 
a binding determination under Chapter VII and the imposition of a duty not 
to recognise the situation by the Security Council makes the implementation 
of a multilateral policy of non-recognition difficult to realise in practice, the 
obligation of non-recognition under general international law arises inde-
pendently of the action by the Security Council 1 1 0 . That is confirmed by the 
107. See Joint Statement by the Netherlands and Finland, supra n. 6 1 . 
108. CRAWFORD , supra n. 103,250. 
109. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namib-
ia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports , 
6, at p . 55 . 
110. See MILANO, supra n. 27 , pp. 139-142; TALMON, "The Duty Not to 'Recognize as 
Lawful ' a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus 
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letter of Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on State responsibility which 
does not lay down any procedure for determining whether or not a serious 
breach has been committed, nor, apart from the case of aggression, does it ac-
knowledge an exclusive competence by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly. Also, in its Wall in Palestine advisory opinion, the ICJ derived the 
obligation of non-recognition for States from its determination of illegality 
without referring to any determination, let alone binding, of political organs 
of the United Nations 1 1 1 . 
In practice, in the lack of a binding determination by the Security Coun-
cil and in the lack of a judicial determination by the ICJ, any third party will 
have to make its own assessment of the situation in Western Sahara. The uni-
versal lack of recognition of the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco 
indicates a clear stance taken by the international community on the legal of 
Morocco's formal claim. While some States like the United States have fol-
lowed through in avoiding any form of implied recognition too, other actors 
like the EC, Russia and Japan have taken a more unclear stance and found a 
modus vivendi that would not sacrifice their fishing interests in the area 1 1 2 . 
More generally, the EC practice with regard to its relations with occupied ter-
ritories or unrecognised entities seems to be based on economic and political 
convenience, rather than abidance by its obligations of non-recognition under 
Cogens Obligation: an Obligation without Real Substance?", in TOMUSCHAT and THOUVENIN 
(eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations 
Erga Omnes (2006, Leiden), p . 99 , at pp. 121-122; CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in In-
ternational Law (Oxford, 2006,2nd ed.), p . 162-173. 
111. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imw-
pframe.htm, paras. 154-160; see also Judge Higgins Separate Opinion, para. 38. One should 
then avoid interpreting some passages of the East Timor decision (supra note 72, especially 
paras. 31-33) as implying the lack of "objective" illegality of territorial situations in interna-
tional law: what the Court was simply stating was the impossibility of a determination of ob-
jective illegality due to the lack of consent to its jurisdiction by the occupying power. 
112. See the Letter of the United States Trade Representative, Robert B . Zoellick, of 20 
July 2004, to Congressman Joseph R. Pitts (available at http:/ /wwwliouse.gov/pit ts/ tempo-
rary/0407191-ustr-moroccoFTA.pdf), in which the Trade Representative set out the Adminis-
tration's position concerning the geographical scope of the Free Trade Agreement between the 
US and Morocco: "The United States and many other countries do not recognize Moroccan 
sovereignty over Western Sahara and have consistently urged the parties to work with the 
United Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means . The FTA will cover trade and in-
vestment in the territory of Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include West-
ern Sahara". On the other hand, there is evidence that both Japan and Russia have in recent 
years entered into fishing agreements with Morocco, extending in their practice to the waters 
of Western Sahara. 
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general international law. With regard to the West Bank and Gaza, the EC re-
fusal to grant preferential treatment to goods imported from Israel under the 
1995 Association Treaty between Israel and the EC seems to be based on the 
willingness of the Community to recognise the Palestinian Authority (PA) as 
the legitimate trading partner for the West Bank and Gaza and its conclusion 
with Palestinian Authority of a trade agreement in 1997, rather than an opinio 
juris sive necessitatis that Israel's authority should receive no defacto recog-
nition on the occupied territories 1 1 3. In fact, before the conclusion of the trade 
agreement with the PA, the West Bank and Gaza were treated by the EC as de 
facto part of Israel under the terms and practice of previous trade agreements 
between the EC and Israel. With regard to the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) and to the scope of the 1972 Association Agreement between 
the Republic of Cyprus and the EC, until 1994 the practice of the Commis-
sion had been to extend the application to certificates of origin issued by the 
TRNC's authorities. Despite the Commission's opposition, the ECJ ruled in 
the case Anastasiou I that non-recognition of the TRNC's authorities would 
imply an obligation on the EC authorities and the authorities of member-
States not to recognise such certificates 1 1 4. While member States' and the 
Commission's practice had eventually to fall in line with the ruling of the 
ECJ with regard to the TRNC, the Commission has continued to accept cer-
tificates of origin from unrecognised entities such as the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) 1 1 5. 
In conclusion, subject to the FPA actually extending in practice to the 
waters of Western Sahara and as a consequence of the practice tending to sac-
rifice legal prudence in favour of political and economic convenience, the EC 
actions may be also found in violation of its obligation of non-recognition. 
The same may be held for the support given to the FPA by Member States 
within the Council. A denial of wrongfulness based on the Namibia exception 
- i .e . that non-recognition "should not result in depriving the people... of any 
advantages derived from international co-operation"- 1 1 6 should rest on the 
evidence the FPA actually brings a benefit to the people of Western Sahara: 
as mentioned above, there is little to suggest that that will happen given the 
113. See HAUSWALDT: "Problems under the EC-Israel Association Agreement: The Ex-
port of Goods Produced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the EC-Israel Association 
Agreement" 14 EJ1L (2003), pp. 591-611. 
114. Case C-432/92 Anastasiou I [1994] ECR 1-3087. 
115. TALMON: "The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Just ice" 12 EJ1L 
(2001), p . 727, at pp. 747-748. 
116. Namibia advisory opinion, supra n. 109, p . 56. 
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demographic composition of the coastal population and the burden of proof 
rests on the EC. 
7. THE LAW OF OCCUPATION AND THE USE OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES BY MOROCCO 
An argument could be made that Morocco's right to use Western Sa-
hara's fisheries should be framed under the law of occupation, rather than a 
vague principle such as that of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
That was the ICJ's approach in the recent decision Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo, where the Court rejected the DRC's use of the princi-
ple of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to test the use of natural 
resources by the army of Uganda and reverted to the applicable international 
humanitarian law 1 1 7 . After all, article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations pro-
vides for a right of usufruct of natural resources by the occupant, and the con-
clusion of an agreement with a third party for the optimal utilisation of fish-
eries may be considered compatible with the exercise of its rights by the 
usufructary as long as it does not lead to the depletion of fisheries in waters 
of Western Sahara 1 1 8 . We believe that this argument is weak when tested 
against the law applicable to the case at hand. 
The first question that should be raised is the applicability at all of the law 
of occupation to Morocco's presence in Western Sahara. Morocco denies the 
applicability of such law, as it considers Western Sahara under its own sover-
eignty. Yet, as we have seen, Morocco's claim to sovereignty over the province 
finds no support under international law. Instead, the General Assembly has 
twice characterised Morocco's presence in Western Sahara as occupation 1 1 9. 
Moreover, article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which are generally con-
sidered expression of customary international law, provides that "[Tjerritory is 
117. Case Concerning the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo, supra n. 80, 
paras. 244-250. 
118. See Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its an-
nex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 
1907. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations provides that "[T]he occupying State shall be re-
garded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and 
agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must 
safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of 
usufruct". 




considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hos-
tile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised". Because of Western Sahara's disputed 
nature and because of Morocco's military control over it, there is a strong case 
to be made that the customary international law of military occupation applies 
to the areas of Western Sahara west of the berm. Such customary international 
law includes article 55 of the 1907 Regulations, which provides for a limited 
use of the natural resources present on the occupied territory. 
More problematic is the extension of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion to Western Sahara. Article 33 of that Convention prohibits pillage by the 
occupying power. While Morocco is party to this instrument, Art. 2 states that 
"[T]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation 
of the territory of a High Contracting Party". Western Sahara is not and has 
never been a High Contracting Party, nor can or could be considered territo-
ry of Spain during the 30 years in which it has been under Morocco's occu-
pation. Furthermore, there has never been an armed conflict between Moroc-
co and Spain (or any other contracting Party for that matter) for the control of 
Western Sahara 1 2 0 . 
By contrast, it is possible to identify the 1977 Protocol I as the instru-
ment of international humanitarian law applicable ratione materiae due to 
Western Sahara's status as NSGT 1 2 1 . Art. 54 of Protocol I appears to set a 
threshold of usufruct of natural resources, which is compatible with the obli-
gations of the occupying power. Article 1(4) of the 1977 Protocol I extends 
the application of the Geneva Conventions to "armed conflicts in which peo-
ples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Howev-
er, Morocco has failed to ratify the 1977 Protocols, arguably due to its will-
ingness to avoid accountability under that instrument for its conduct in West-
ern Sahara. Thus, we must conclude that not even the 1977 Protocol I is 
applicable to Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara. 
In sum, while no conventional instrument regulating military occupa-
tions regulates directly the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, there is 
120. Legality ofWall, supra n. I l l , paras. 95-101. 
121. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and applicable 
to the Protection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,1125 LINTS 3. 
448 
THE NEW FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN. 
a strong argument to be made that the customary international law of mili-
tary occupation as codified in the Hague Regulations should apply, includ-
ing the principle of usufruct for the use of natural resources in the part of the 
Territory under Moroccan control. However, we believe that such rules of 
usufruct should be interpreted in the light of more recent applicable rules re-
lated to the use of natural resources in NSGTs, not in derogation of them. In 
other words, the conclusions reached above on the legality of the FPA are 
not affected by the finding that the customary international law of military 
occupations applies to Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara. This propo-
sition is reinforced by the fact that the territorial situation of Western Sahara 
has not been and is not at the time of writing that of a mere temporary mili-
tary occupation of a State's territory by another State, but also that in which 
military occupation and a 30 years-long civil administration of a NSGT have 
gone hand in hand: in other words, the situation of Western Sahara hardly 
fits in concrete the standard features of military occupations which were in-
deed present in Uganda's occupation of the eastern part of the D R C 1 2 2 . It is 
perhaps not a coincidence that the UN Legal Advisor in his legal opinion of 
2002 has not mentioned at all the rules related to military occupation 1 2 3 . 
While the rules of usufruct do apply in our opinion to the case under exami-
nation, the special status of the Territory and the nature of the occupation 
lead us to conclude that they should be interpreted in light of other applica-
ble rules, such as that of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in 
NSGTs, hence to prohibit any exploitation of natural resources which is not 
conducted for the benefit and is not in accordance with the wishes of the lo-
cal population. 
8. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES OF THE FPA BEFORE JUDICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Finally, some thoughts must be devoted to the possibility that the FPA 
may be challenged before a judicial institution and reviewed by it. Many im-
pediments stand in the way of a realistic and successful challenge of the FPA, 
122. But even in standard military occupations, such as that of Uganda in the DRC or 
that of the Coalition Forces in Iraq, there is a clear obligation to interpret the rules of usufruct 
under Article 55 of the Hague Regulations to make sure that the use of natural resources fully 
satisfies the needs of the local population. See the discussion on this point Benvenisti: "Wa-
ter Conflicts during the Occupation of Iraq" 97 AJIL (2003), 860, at 863-864, 867-868 
123. UN Legal Opinion, supra n. 85. 
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but there are certainly a few venues that could be used to submit a claim to 
the effect that the FPA breaches international law. 
On the international plane, the obvious and more immediate solution 
would be a claim before the ICJ, the main judicial organ of the United Na-
tions: the ICJ has already rendered an advisory opinion on Western Sahara 
and it has more than once engaged with the right of self-determination of 
peoples and the duty of non-recognition of situations created by serious vio-
lations of peremptory norms. While the ICJ would be most probably the best 
suited tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating the substance of the claim, 
there are serious doubts over the possibility that it could assert jurisdiction. 
In one respect, the actors who are mostly interested in the safeguarding 
the rights of the people of Western Sahara lack locus standi: that is especial-
ly the case for any legitimate representatives, such as POLISARIO or the 
SADR, which do not have the pre-requisite of statehood necessary to file a 
claim before the Court. Another possibility would be a claim brought by the 
de jure administering Power against Morocco or the EC Member States, sim-
ilarly to Portugal's action against Australia in the East Timor case 1 2 4 . Again, 
this possibility appears quite unrealistic due to the fact that Spain, the de jure 
administering Power, was the main driving force behind the conclusion of the 
FPA and it may become the main driving force in the extension of the agree-
ment to the waters of Western Sahara. Besides, even if Spain was willing to 
bring a claim, the Court would be most likely faced with the same situation it 
was faced in the East Timor case and would have to deny jurisdiction on the 
grounds that Morocco has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court; in other words, the Court would not be able to "isolate" a legal dispute 
between Spain and other EC States fishing in the waters of Western Sahara 
under the terms of the FPA without assessing the position of Morocco. 
One must also rule out the possibility that a third interested State may 
bring a claim against an EC Member States challenging the FPA and the con-
duct of fishing in the waters of Western Sahara, as there is little to suggest 
that the obligation to respect NSGTs permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources and the rules related to it are obligations erga omnes, conferring on 
all members of the international community a right to claim a breach of those 
rules. A possible venue to overcome the East Timor jurisdiction restraints 
would be for a third State, which has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, to place the burden on the de jure administering Power Spain and 
124. East Timor, supra n. 72. 
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challenge its contribution to the conclusion of the FPA with Morocco, to-
gether with other alleged violations of its Art. 73 obligations under the UN 
Charter. In this case, the main impediment would be the need for the Court 
to look at the history of Spain's role as administering Power of Western Sa-
hara and the "control" of that history by Spain's Art. 36(2) declaration made 
on 29 October 1990, specifically para. 1, lett. d) which excludes disputes 
"arising prior to the date on which this Declaration was deposited or relat-
ing to events or situations which occurred prior to that date, even if such 
events or situations may continue to occur or to have effects thereafter (em-
phasis added)" 1 2 5 . 
Possibly the most realistic venue would be a challenge by either a Mem-
ber State or the European Parliament before the ECJ under Art. 230 of the EC 
Treaty. By no means, this kind of challenge would be straight-forward. The 
option to challenge the decision of the Council of 22 May 2006 to authorise 
the signature of the FPA would be impaired by the two months time-limit set 
by paragraph 5 of Art. 230 to bring an action against the contested act. The 
Council Regulation as such, which may be covered by the grounds of invo-
cability set out in Art. 241 of the EC Treaty, would be hard to challenge giv-
en that it only allocates fishing quotas between Member States for internal 
purposes and it does not refer, either explicitly or implicitly, to the geograph-
ical areas where fishing is allowed. The more realistic challenge would con-
cern the FPA once it enters into force and any practice by the Commission of 
requesting and passing on licenses concerning the waters of Western Sahara 
to European fishermen. In our opinion, this latter ground of invocability 
would be necessary, given the FPA lack of references to Western Sahara. In 
such action, the substantive claim should concern the infringement by the EC 
of rules of general international law concerning the sovereignty over natural 
resources in NSGTs and the duty of non-recognition with regard to situations 
stemming from serious violations of peremptory norms. 
With regard to this latter aspect, while State practice is far from clear on 
the extent and applicability of the duty of non-recognition in economic rela-
tions with unrecognised States or de facto annexed territories, the ECJ in 
Anastasiou I did indeed uphold an interpretation of the 1972 Association 
Agreement between the EC and Cyprus which would exclude movement and 
phytosanitary certificates issued by the custom authorities of the Turkish Re-
125. See Declaration of Spain of 15 October 1990 accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 




public of Northern Cyprus due to the lack of recognition of the Turkish 
Cypriot entity 1 2 6 . While in terms of practical implications the Anastasiou 
claim is by no means comparable to a possible challenge by a Member State 
or the European Parliament and it may be more burdensome to argue the ille-
gality of fishing licenses from a recognised State for a defacto annexed ter-
ritory than the illegality of custom certificates from an unrecognised Entity, 
the ratio decidendi of the Luxembourg Court in that case suggests that the 
Court would be ready to uphold an interpretation of the FPA excluding West-
ern Sahara from its geographical scope, due to the lack of recognition by the 
EC and its Member States of the legality of Morocco's administration of the 
Territory. 
More problematic would be an action under Art. 230, para. 4, as the pri-
vate person would have to prove a direct and individual concern, i.e. a direct 
effect on its rights of the decision of the Commission to requests and obtain 
fishing licenses for the waters of Western Sahara. In theory, we could have a 
scenario where one or more fishermen based in Western Sahara would bring 
an action before the Court of First Instance. There is little to suggest that the 
Court would be ready to accept a claim to the effect that the FPA and the 
granting of licenses in Western Sahara would directly affect the fishing rights 
of fishermen in Western Sahara; in particular, it would be hardly possible for 
those fishermen to bring evidence that the fishing of European boats in the 
waters of Western Sahara is preventing them from exercising their fishing 
rights. 
Perhaps a more viable solution for an individual request of review of the 
legality of the FPA and the practice of the Commission related to it would be 
an action before a domestic court in a domestic legal system having less strin-
gent admissibility requirements than those set out under the EC Treaty. But 
even in the most "monistic" domestic legal systems, the procedural and sub-
stantive obstacles would be difficult to overcome. For example, in the case of 
the Netherlands, an NGO supporting the rights of the people of Western Sa-
hara may bring a tort action against the State of the Netherlands before a civ-
il court -most plausibly for its failure to uphold its duty of non-recognition 
by voting in favour of the FPA within the Council, as well as holding it ac-
countable for the exploitation of natural resources- and seek a declaratory 
judgement to the effect that the defendant is in violation of international 
126. Anastasiou I, supra n. 114, and comment in Talmon, supra n. 115, p . 727; ELIAS, 
"General International Law in the European Court of Justice: from Hypothesis to Reali ty?", 
XXXINYIL (2000), p . 3 , at p . 23-24. 
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law 1 2 7 . The preliminary legal condition the claimant would have to meet is 
the admissibility of its claim before a civil court: in particular, the court 
would have to be satisfied that the international norms whose breach is in-
voked confer rights to the individuals concerned, i.e. they are self-execut-
ing 1 2 8 . The NGO acting on behalf of the people of Western Sahara could pos-
sibly claim that the obligation of non-recognition and the obligations related 
to the use of natural resources in a NSGT are owed by the Netherlands to the 
NSGT and the people based thereon, hence it should be admissible to invoke 
this type of violation before a civil court. Yet, in the absence of a specific and 
clearly identifiable individual right to be protected, it is doubtful that a court 
would accept this type of argument. An alternative ground may be to argue on 
the basis of a due care standard, where international law would give effect to 
that standard; but, again, judicial practice and constitutional history in the 
Netherlands does not seem to be supportive of this type of claims. 
Even if the civil court found the claim admissible on either of these 
bases, other obstacles would come in the way of a successful legal action. 
With regard to the obligations related to the exploitation of natural resources 
in Western Sahara, the claimants would find themselves in the uncomfortable 
position of having to rebut the presumption that Member States are not re-
sponsible for the actions of the EC, when it acts in the exercise of its exclu-
sive competence. With regard to the obligation of non-recognition incumbent 
upon the Netherlands, while voting in favour of the FPA in the competent in-
ternational organisation may be considered as such an act of implied recogni-
tion in violation of the obligation of non-recognition under customary inter-
national law, one would have to consider the weight that the national judge 
may give to the Netherlands' disclaimer that "the FPA may not be considered 
as acceptance of territorial claims not supported by international law" 1 2 9 . The 
practice of courts in the Netherlands -similarly to the practice of domestic 
courts in most countries- is to show a large degree of restraint and deference 
to the executive in assessing applications related to acts with a clear foreign 
127. See Articles 93 and 112 of the 1983 Constitution of the Netherlands. Art. 93 is es-
pecially interesting as it provides for the direct applicability of treaty provisions and resolu-
tions of international organisations which are self-executing because of their normative con-
tent. See also Article 305a of Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code that provides that a legal person 
("vereniging of stiching met volleldige rechtspersoonlijkheid") can bring a claim for a wrong-
ful act with a view to the protection of certain interests, if that legal person protects these in-
terests according to its statutes. 
128. E.g. Supreme Court Decision of 6 February 2004, LJN: AN8071 (available in 
Dutch). 
129. See Joint Statement by the Netherlands and Finland, supra n. 6 1 . 
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policy dimension 1 3 0 . Even if voting in favour of a bilateral fisheries agree-
ment within a regional economic organisation does not entail as such a clear 
foreign policy dimension, the declaration issued by the Netherlands shows 
that the implications in terms of national foreign policy should not be easily 
discounted. It is hard to believe that a civil court or the Supreme Court would 
do that. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
In the recent Ali Yusuf case, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Community has reiterated that "the Community must respect international 
law in the exercise of its powers and, consequently, Community law must be 
interpreted, and its scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of interna-
tional law" 1 3 1 . This passage was in our opinion perfectly interpreted and ap-
plied ante litteram by the Commission to the case of the fisheries agreements 
between the EC and Morocco in 1988, when the then Commissioner for Fish-
eries answered a parliamentary question on the geographic scope of the 1988 
Fisheries agreement between the EC and Morocco and its possible extension 
to Western Sahara. This was the position of the Commission at that time: 
"[...] the recent agreement initialled with the Kingdom of Morocco concerns 
the fishing rights granted to the Community in the waters under the jurisdiction 
or sovereignty of the third country in question. The extent of these waters must 
be determined in accordance with international law (emphasis added)" 1 3 2 . On 
a straight-forward question on the geographical scope of the fisheries agree-
ment, the Commission responded by referring to a geographical determina-
tion based on international law. 
We believe that this latter principle should have been the starting point 
of any renewed legal discussion of the implications of the FPA for the West-
ern Sahara issue. The preliminary questions should have been the extent of 
130. See Association for Lawyers for Peace, "Millions are Against" Foundation and oth-
ers v. the State of the Netherlands, Supreme Court Decision of 21 December 2001 , LJN No . 
ZC3693, para. 3.3. English translation available in XXXIV NYIL (2003), p . 383. 
131. Ahmed Ali Yusuf, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communit ies, supported by the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case T-206/01, Judgment of 21 September 2005, para. 
249. 
132. Question no. 67, by Mrs Le Roux (H-1002/87), Answer of the Commission of 9 
March 1988, OJ 2-363/191. 
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Moroccan fisheries under international law, the treaty-making power of Mo-
rocco with regard to the fisheries located off the coast of Western Sahara and 
the validity of any treaty thereto related. As we have seen above, the likely 
conclusion on the legal analysis of this question would have been that Moroc-
co does not have the capacity under international law to enter into treaties 
concerning the territory of Western Sahara and the essential rights of the peo-
ple of that Territory. 
The Legal Services of the Parliament and the Council, respectively, have 
instead taken as a point of reference the UN Legal Opinion of 2002. While 
the UN Legal Opinion is certainly relevant to the legal question of the use of 
natural resources in Western Sahara and was rightly given full attention in the 
two legal opinions, the Legal Services have too easily discounted the differ-
ence between the legality under international law of concessions or contracts 
entered into by Morocco with private companies under Moroccan law or 
some standard international contract forms - the subject of the legal request 
by the UN Security Council in 2002- and the legality of a treaty entered into 
by Morocco with an international organisation having international legal per-
sonality - the subject of both requests within the EU Council and the Parlia-
ment-. It is submitted that this latter case demands a distinct formal analysis, 
that albeit not necessarily leading to a blunt denial of any treaty-making pow-
er, should have required addressing a whole set of different legal questions. 
But even the focus on the UN Legal Opinion is not entirely satisfactory. 
The Legal Service of the Parliament appears to have interpreted the UN Le-
gal Opinion as considering Morocco the only addressee of international legal 
obligations concerning the use of natural resources in Western Sahara, as if, 
under the terms of the FPA, the Community did not play any relevant role in 
the "actual fishing" of natural resources. It has also decided to disregard the 
element "wishes" in the proposition identified in the UN Legal Opinion that 
any exploitation of natural resource should not be conducted "in disregard of 
the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara" 1 3 3; as seen, this has 
allowed the Community to discount the opinion expressed by POLISARIO on 
the desirability and the effects of the conclusion of such agreement. Further-
more, the Parliament's Legal Service, as well as EC institutions, should be 
aware that any benefit accruing on the coastal population will hardly cover 
the Saharawi population, which lives for most part in the refugee camps set 
in the Tindouf region in Algeria; it will rather accrue on the Moroccan peo-
133. UN Legal Opinion, supra n. 85, para. 25 . 
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pie, whose settlement in the coastal areas of Western Sahara has been consis-
tently pursued by the Moroccan government throughout the years. 
Apart from and beyond the legal issues involved in the signature and im-
plementation of the FPA, the broader policy implications for the Western Sa-
hara dispute finally deserve some comments. The Rapporteur of the Commit-
tee on Fisheries, Mr Daniel Várela Suanzes-Carpegna, observes in his last 
report on the FPA that "in this Agreement too the EU adopts the same politi-
cal stance vis-á-vis Western Sahara as in all previous fisheries agreements 
with Morocco. He urges that this stance should remain unchanged, so not to 
alter the international status quo prevailing in respect of the dispute, under-
mine the UN's principles or infringe international law" 1 3 4 . However, it is 
frankly difficult to infer any political stance taken by the EU, or the EC for 
that matter, in the conclusion of the agreement; if anything, the EC seems 
very keen to fully avoid the political dimension of the Western Sahara dis-
pute. What is possible to infer from the EC institutions is a prevailing will to 
ignore the special status of Western Sahara and deal with the status quo in the 
interest of its relations with a neighbouring country, Morocco, and in the in-
terest of the development of fisheries common policy. In this respect, two ob-
servations must be made. 
Firstly, it is in our opinion the maintenance and consolidation of the sta-
tus quo, that the EC accepts and contributes to strengthen, that undermines 
the UN's principles, especially that of self-determination of peoples, and in-
fringes international law. At the present state of affairs, there is little hope that 
Morocco will accept the organisation and implementation of the results of a 
referendum, providing the option for full independence of Western Sahara. 
While the entering into the FPA and the extension of its geographical scope 
to Western Sahara does not breach as such any rule of jus cogens, it repre-
sents an act of implied recognition by the EC of an unlawful territorial situa-
tion, that has arguably represented a continuing violation of jus cogens norms 
for over thirty years. Apart from the possible violation of international norms 
that such act may entail, the policy behind this act may undermine the claim 
that the EU plays and will play in the future a neutral and even-handed role 
in the solution of the Western Sahara dispute. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, while with previous agree-
ments an argument could be made that the economic benefits of entering a 
fisheries agreement with Morocco extending to Western Sahara outweighed 
134. See Report of the Committee on Fisheries, supra n. 38 , Explanatory Statement. 
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the costs of being perceived as compromising on international law and prin-
ciples of international justice, such argument is much less tenable with the 
present FPA. As we have seen, Morocco has severely restricted the possibili-
ty of EC vessels fishing the most valuable species found in the waters of 
Western Sahara, such as cephalopods and crustaceans. While industrial fish-
ing in the waters of Western Sahara has important economic potentials and, 
unlike with previous agreements, is now extended to many EC countries, al-
ternatives could have been found by negotiating better terms with other coun-
tries in the Eastern Atlantic or even by promoting joint ventures between Mo-
roccan and European fishermen for fishing activities in Western Sahara. In 
other words* the economic benefits of fishing in Western Sahara are this time 
clearly outweighed by the damaging perception that the EC is ready to com-
promise on its commitments to the compliance with international law, when 
that suits its economic interest; such conclusion is especially warranted when 
one compares the US position on the extension of its Free Trade Agreement 
to Western Sahara. 
In conclusion, we must repeat that the present analysis is based on the 
hypothesis that the practice related to the FPA will extend to the waters off 
the coast of Western Sahara; while the hypothesis is likely to be realised in 
the future, there is nothing inevitable about its realisation. On the contrary, 
we believe that by not seeking licenses for fishing in the waters of Western 
Sahara the EC would have much to gain in terms of its compliance with in-
ternational law and of how it is perceived world-wide and little to loose in 
terms of economic costs. Such policy would make sure that the EC does not 
risk violating any rule of international and indeed, if that is one of its declared 
objectives, that it truly avoids interfering with the solution of the Western Sa-
hara dispute. This policy would not even require any official statement or 
declaration by the Commission to the extent that the geographical scope of 
the FPA does not include the waters of Western Sahara because of its contest-
ed status, which may be indeed too costly in terms of its bilateral relations 
with Morocco, especially at a time when Morocco has not ratified the FPA 
yet. The terms of the equation should be reverted: the FPA does neither in-
clude nor exclude the waters of Western Sahara and it is up to the EC to de-
cide whether to apply for licenses in its waters. 
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